Jeffrey Neuzil
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- Nov 30, 2007
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To the memory of Franz Rosenwieg and Walter Rathanau—Friends of Philosophy, Politics, Freedom
The Jewish Question Of Spirit: On a Certain Profound "Modification" of the Galut
I touch here upon the problem of the Genesis of Christianity. The 'first' principle for its solution is: Christianity can be understood only in terms of the soil out of which it grew—it is not a movement of opposition against the Jewish instinct, it is its very consequence itself.—(Nietzsche's Antichrist, 24)
Oh no, no know—It's "never again,"—Again!—anonymous witt(en).
What I hope to do in this essay is set forth an interpretation of certain puzzling and profound features of Leo Strauss' "Auto-biographical Preface" to his work, "Spinozas' Critique of Religion," a preface that was interestingly added to the work in 1965, the year, incidentally, in which Malcolm X was assassinated in New York City.
It is my provisional contention that of all of Strauss' published works this statement is, perhaps, the deepest expression of the political intentions of Mr. Strauss' work, but that it is also one of the most enigmatic and even subterranean, if Serpentine, of his formulations of those intentions. The statement begins almost literally in the war torn and besieged Germany of Leo Strauss' youth, where Strauss himself came "face-to-face" with the "Theological-Political predicament," or the "Theological Political Problem."
The essay, it is obvious to see, is an attempt to wrestle with a question that was posed by Karl Marx in the 19th century, namely, what is to be done with respect to the Jews?—with respect to assimilation or non-assimilation?: In other words, Strauss tried to forcefully and manfully confront the issue of how the Jews were to avoid endless pogroms and persecution, how they were to survive in a hostile world in which liberalism and liberal democracy had let them down, casting them about violently in a state of Diaspora and dispersion, not unrelated to the "Falleness" that is made thematic by Heidegger in relation to his Dasien analysis of "Zein und Ziet."
If the outcome of modernity seemed in no way to provide the answer to the Jewish question—in other words, if assimilation "proved" to be untenable and incompatible with natural right or history, then some form of "return" must—per impossible?—be effected; but what made this so problematic, as Strauss was, on my analysis, so prescient to see, was that this required the rehabilitation of Jewish "Culture," and this was also shown by Strauss to be inadaquate, for any "return" merely on the level of "culture," or even politics, if the Zionist solution was prefered, was inadaquate, because it did not allow for the kind of absolute comittment that was necessary to the survival of a people in a hostile, even murderously hostile, world: The most manifest implication of this, Strauss argues profoundly, is that a "return" to Jewish orthodoxy in the deepest and most religious and spiritual sense is the one thing needful—and, indeed, in some sense, this is a, paradoxically, "progressive return."
However much one can agree with this conclusion of Strauss' analysis, one must probe more deeply to fathom the manner in which Strauss would effect this return to orthodoxy on the plane of the spiritual, religious, cultural, Prophetic, and, finally, political plane of History itself; and all of this is further made complicated by Strauss' attempt to return to a conception of a mysterious and unknown, perhaps unknowable, Deity—belief in which, or Whom, is a prerequisite for the regeneration of Jewish High culture and Spirit and an overcoming of the political weakness—or as Strauss has it effeminency—which has prevented the Jews from attaining their rightful high place among the religions of the world.
Much more can, and should, in my view be said about this conception of the deity set forth by Strauss, but it has the peculiar, if not paradoxical, consequence of not being based on revelation or being based on revelation that is incomplete to the degree that Strauss emphasizes both the "mysteriousness" and "unknowability" of this deity, which provokes the question, "To what degree is revelation being attenuated or "displaced" in this analysis(?) To what degree is this conception of the deity in Strauss more like the God of Islam or even of the Islamic Aristotelians than like the Biblical deity? This "displacement" or "attenuation" of Revelation was already a profound implication of Strauss' "Philosophy and Law," where Strauss' reasons that philosophy is the highest way of life, and, thus, is "commanded" by the law of Revelation, but once initiated, philosophy appears to secure for itself a realm, if not "The" Realm of Freedom, and thus can "modify" through textual interpretation Revelation. This is a question that is quite complex in Strauss for the very reason that he breathes the theological air of not just one religious tradition, but many; when the "mysterious" and "unknowable" character of the deity is emphasized—and this is proclaimed forthrightly in Strauss' reference to the God of scripture as the God who shall, at the end of time, "Be what He shall Be," not be what he always was, which is another way of saying that scripture may have merely revealed one mode of an evolving deity.
Perhaps this conviction of Strauss' is what leads him to the conclusion that Maimonides procedure of "Negative Theology" is primary, and so all that can be said or shown of God is that He is not this or that thing, this or that lifeless or living thing, but something else altogether: (I suspect that there may be a profound conection here between Kojeve's "Master and Slave dialectic," and that this latter concept or practice would, perhaps, illuminate the former: If it would not, at the same time, cast one into the darkest dungeon of the darkest kingdom "within" the Kingdom of Darkness!)—: The most that can be said is that in this conception of God all that we can do is wait for Him to reveal Himself to man and to provide a respite from our Theologically "Fallen" age. And it is not accidental, if it is not exactly necessitated, possibly, that the most supple currents of Francophone Philosophy have proclaimed both the "Death of God," and the "Death of Man": while they have not, correspondingly,—yet may soon—declare the death of "Manna," (see Robert Pippin's references to the "Pathologies" of "late-stage" capitalism as well as his reference to Strauss' "On Tyranny," as presenting a essentially "twofold" teaching, divisible (like the human brain) into a first part, "pathology" and a second part, "therapeutics" (Cf. Heidegger's originally projected "twofold" Zein und Ziet, which was to contain a "pathological" analysis of Kant, if not also a "therapeutic" analysis as well and both Hannah Arendt's work on Kant's political philosophy and Kojeve's untranslated work on Kant).
Strauss declares in his preface the the creation of the state of Israel will prove to be a blessing to all Jews everywhere, even if they do not know it (Yet?)! If I understand Strauss correctly here he means to be suggesting—but not only suggesting—that since the foundation of the state of Israel, Jews no longer face that level of extreme vulnerability in the world which once they did, for now they have a home to which they can "return" and to which they will be welcomed in however dire of a circumstance they may find themselves—and this for all the"forseeable future."
But could one not ask if the Jews in this current situation, supposing that a new "wave" of anti-semitism should erupt, thereby forcing Jews everywhere to migrate to Israel, if the Jews would not find themselves in the most "concentrated" of all "concentration" camps ever constructed: so that what appeared—but only appeared—to be a blessing for "all Jews everywhere" might prove to be indeed the largest curse upon them, for they would then be vulnerable to attack from without by whatever hostile power existed, and they would be concentrated and thus vulnerable on a mass scale—something that was not a problem for Diaspora Jews. In this sense, but only in this sense, could one say that the foundation of the state of Israel represents the profoundest "modification" (See SPPP 'modification' or 'modify') of the Galut—but only a modification: which should give a profound impetus for scholars to begin a serious and critical study of the historical foundations of Zionism and its relationship to the foundation of the state of Israel as well as the United States' role in this process?
One could, perhaps, draw an analogy to the "vulnerability" of philosophy on Strauss' analysis in "On Tyranny" after the coming into being of the "Universal and Final Tyrant," who would preside over the "Universal and Homogenous State," should such a state come to pass: The philosopher in this situation would have nowhere to seek refuge, just as a Jew, driven to Israel by persecution would have nowhere else to go, if the outside world should succumb to a ruthlessly anti-semitic—and misologistic—ideology.
The Jewish Question Of Spirit: On a Certain Profound "Modification" of the Galut
I touch here upon the problem of the Genesis of Christianity. The 'first' principle for its solution is: Christianity can be understood only in terms of the soil out of which it grew—it is not a movement of opposition against the Jewish instinct, it is its very consequence itself.—(Nietzsche's Antichrist, 24)
Oh no, no know—It's "never again,"—Again!—anonymous witt(en).
What I hope to do in this essay is set forth an interpretation of certain puzzling and profound features of Leo Strauss' "Auto-biographical Preface" to his work, "Spinozas' Critique of Religion," a preface that was interestingly added to the work in 1965, the year, incidentally, in which Malcolm X was assassinated in New York City.
It is my provisional contention that of all of Strauss' published works this statement is, perhaps, the deepest expression of the political intentions of Mr. Strauss' work, but that it is also one of the most enigmatic and even subterranean, if Serpentine, of his formulations of those intentions. The statement begins almost literally in the war torn and besieged Germany of Leo Strauss' youth, where Strauss himself came "face-to-face" with the "Theological-Political predicament," or the "Theological Political Problem."
The essay, it is obvious to see, is an attempt to wrestle with a question that was posed by Karl Marx in the 19th century, namely, what is to be done with respect to the Jews?—with respect to assimilation or non-assimilation?: In other words, Strauss tried to forcefully and manfully confront the issue of how the Jews were to avoid endless pogroms and persecution, how they were to survive in a hostile world in which liberalism and liberal democracy had let them down, casting them about violently in a state of Diaspora and dispersion, not unrelated to the "Falleness" that is made thematic by Heidegger in relation to his Dasien analysis of "Zein und Ziet."
If the outcome of modernity seemed in no way to provide the answer to the Jewish question—in other words, if assimilation "proved" to be untenable and incompatible with natural right or history, then some form of "return" must—per impossible?—be effected; but what made this so problematic, as Strauss was, on my analysis, so prescient to see, was that this required the rehabilitation of Jewish "Culture," and this was also shown by Strauss to be inadaquate, for any "return" merely on the level of "culture," or even politics, if the Zionist solution was prefered, was inadaquate, because it did not allow for the kind of absolute comittment that was necessary to the survival of a people in a hostile, even murderously hostile, world: The most manifest implication of this, Strauss argues profoundly, is that a "return" to Jewish orthodoxy in the deepest and most religious and spiritual sense is the one thing needful—and, indeed, in some sense, this is a, paradoxically, "progressive return."
However much one can agree with this conclusion of Strauss' analysis, one must probe more deeply to fathom the manner in which Strauss would effect this return to orthodoxy on the plane of the spiritual, religious, cultural, Prophetic, and, finally, political plane of History itself; and all of this is further made complicated by Strauss' attempt to return to a conception of a mysterious and unknown, perhaps unknowable, Deity—belief in which, or Whom, is a prerequisite for the regeneration of Jewish High culture and Spirit and an overcoming of the political weakness—or as Strauss has it effeminency—which has prevented the Jews from attaining their rightful high place among the religions of the world.
Much more can, and should, in my view be said about this conception of the deity set forth by Strauss, but it has the peculiar, if not paradoxical, consequence of not being based on revelation or being based on revelation that is incomplete to the degree that Strauss emphasizes both the "mysteriousness" and "unknowability" of this deity, which provokes the question, "To what degree is revelation being attenuated or "displaced" in this analysis(?) To what degree is this conception of the deity in Strauss more like the God of Islam or even of the Islamic Aristotelians than like the Biblical deity? This "displacement" or "attenuation" of Revelation was already a profound implication of Strauss' "Philosophy and Law," where Strauss' reasons that philosophy is the highest way of life, and, thus, is "commanded" by the law of Revelation, but once initiated, philosophy appears to secure for itself a realm, if not "The" Realm of Freedom, and thus can "modify" through textual interpretation Revelation. This is a question that is quite complex in Strauss for the very reason that he breathes the theological air of not just one religious tradition, but many; when the "mysterious" and "unknowable" character of the deity is emphasized—and this is proclaimed forthrightly in Strauss' reference to the God of scripture as the God who shall, at the end of time, "Be what He shall Be," not be what he always was, which is another way of saying that scripture may have merely revealed one mode of an evolving deity.
Perhaps this conviction of Strauss' is what leads him to the conclusion that Maimonides procedure of "Negative Theology" is primary, and so all that can be said or shown of God is that He is not this or that thing, this or that lifeless or living thing, but something else altogether: (I suspect that there may be a profound conection here between Kojeve's "Master and Slave dialectic," and that this latter concept or practice would, perhaps, illuminate the former: If it would not, at the same time, cast one into the darkest dungeon of the darkest kingdom "within" the Kingdom of Darkness!)—: The most that can be said is that in this conception of God all that we can do is wait for Him to reveal Himself to man and to provide a respite from our Theologically "Fallen" age. And it is not accidental, if it is not exactly necessitated, possibly, that the most supple currents of Francophone Philosophy have proclaimed both the "Death of God," and the "Death of Man": while they have not, correspondingly,—yet may soon—declare the death of "Manna," (see Robert Pippin's references to the "Pathologies" of "late-stage" capitalism as well as his reference to Strauss' "On Tyranny," as presenting a essentially "twofold" teaching, divisible (like the human brain) into a first part, "pathology" and a second part, "therapeutics" (Cf. Heidegger's originally projected "twofold" Zein und Ziet, which was to contain a "pathological" analysis of Kant, if not also a "therapeutic" analysis as well and both Hannah Arendt's work on Kant's political philosophy and Kojeve's untranslated work on Kant).
Strauss declares in his preface the the creation of the state of Israel will prove to be a blessing to all Jews everywhere, even if they do not know it (Yet?)! If I understand Strauss correctly here he means to be suggesting—but not only suggesting—that since the foundation of the state of Israel, Jews no longer face that level of extreme vulnerability in the world which once they did, for now they have a home to which they can "return" and to which they will be welcomed in however dire of a circumstance they may find themselves—and this for all the"forseeable future."
But could one not ask if the Jews in this current situation, supposing that a new "wave" of anti-semitism should erupt, thereby forcing Jews everywhere to migrate to Israel, if the Jews would not find themselves in the most "concentrated" of all "concentration" camps ever constructed: so that what appeared—but only appeared—to be a blessing for "all Jews everywhere" might prove to be indeed the largest curse upon them, for they would then be vulnerable to attack from without by whatever hostile power existed, and they would be concentrated and thus vulnerable on a mass scale—something that was not a problem for Diaspora Jews. In this sense, but only in this sense, could one say that the foundation of the state of Israel represents the profoundest "modification" (See SPPP 'modification' or 'modify') of the Galut—but only a modification: which should give a profound impetus for scholars to begin a serious and critical study of the historical foundations of Zionism and its relationship to the foundation of the state of Israel as well as the United States' role in this process?
One could, perhaps, draw an analogy to the "vulnerability" of philosophy on Strauss' analysis in "On Tyranny" after the coming into being of the "Universal and Final Tyrant," who would preside over the "Universal and Homogenous State," should such a state come to pass: The philosopher in this situation would have nowhere to seek refuge, just as a Jew, driven to Israel by persecution would have nowhere else to go, if the outside world should succumb to a ruthlessly anti-semitic—and misologistic—ideology.