Stalin
Well-Known Member
- Joined
- Apr 4, 2008
- Messages
- 4,114
For decades, Israel has cultivated the image of military invincibility, a state that repeatedly defeated Arab armies in conventional war. But the historical record tells a far more complicated story.
In 1948, the so-called Arab coalition was neither unified nor sovereign in any meaningful sense. Much of the Arab world was still emerging from direct European colonial rule.
The same British Empire that had administered Palestine had trained, armed and effectively commanded Transjordan’s Arab Legion. Its commander was a British officer, Glubb Pasha. The most capable Arab army in the field was not operating under an independent, unified Arab command structure.
King Abdullah of Jordan was focused less on defending Palestine in its entirety than on securing control over the West Bank. His political calculations shaped the limits of engagement.
Israeli society is intoxicated by war and the dream of expansion. It cannot last
Read More »
Jordan’s army was constrained and redirected even while holding ground against Zionist forces, its battlefield momentum subordinated to territorial ambition, rather than deployed in a coordinated Arab strategy.
Egypt’s performance in 1948 was shaped by dysfunction at the highest levels. Under King Farouk, the Egyptian army entered the war poorly prepared, with confused command structures and inadequate coordination.
The infamous “defective weapons” scandal later rocked Cairo, with allegations that soldiers had been supplied with faulty ammunition and unusable arms - a controversy that fuelled public outrage and helped pave the way for the Free Officers’ coup in 1952.
Meanwhile, Palestinian fighters faced an even harsher reality. Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, leading irregular forces around Jerusalem, pleaded repeatedly for weapons and reinforcements that never arrived. Before the Battle of al-Qastal in April 1948, he sent urgent appeals for ammunition.
Two days before his death, he wrote to the secretary general of the Arab League: “I hold you responsible after you have left my soldiers at the height of their victories without support or weapons.”
He and his men fought to the last bullet. He was killed in combat. His forces were not backed by a unified Arab command; they were fighting largely alone.
There was no coordinated, sovereign, unified Arab conventional war machine in 1948. There were fragmented states, rival monarchies, colonial entanglements, competing ambitions, and uneven military capacity.
Israel did not defeat a cohesive pan-Arab army. It emerged in an Arab world still under the shadow - and often the direct influence - of European colonial power structures, while benefitting from superior organisation and international support.
The myth of having “defeated the Arab armies” was later polished into a national legend.
In 1967, Israel’s decisive advantage came from a pre-emptive air strike that destroyed Egypt’s air force on the ground within hours. Once air supremacy was secured, the outcome was largely predetermined. It was not a prolonged, balanced clash between evenly matched armies; it was a paralysing blow delivered before full conventional engagement could unfold.
The 1973 war complicates the myth further. In October of that year, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal, breached the Bar Lev Line, and advanced into Sinai, in a surprise offensive that stunned the Israeli command and punctured the aura of invincibility established in 1967.
For the first time since Israel’s founding, an Arab army demonstrated planning, coordination, and battlefield competence on a scale that forced Israel onto the defensive. Yet the military momentum was not converted into a strategic transformation.
A massive American airlift replenished Israeli losses and stabilised its position, altering the balance once more. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, eager to pivot towards Washington and secure a political settlement, moved quickly into negotiations.
What began as a military shock evolved into a diplomatic realignment, culminating in the Camp David Accords.
Since then, Israel’s principal confrontations have been with non-state actors. In Lebanon, it faced Hezbollah and was forced to withdraw.
In Gaza, despite immense US backing and overwhelming firepower, it has not eliminated Hamas. Hostages were recovered through negotiated deals, not decisive battlefield annihilation.
Israel has grown accustomed to aerial bombardment against fragmented opponents, not sustained, attritional warfare against a large, organised army backed by unified political leadership.
www.middleeasteye.net
comrade stalin
moscow
In 1948, the so-called Arab coalition was neither unified nor sovereign in any meaningful sense. Much of the Arab world was still emerging from direct European colonial rule.
The same British Empire that had administered Palestine had trained, armed and effectively commanded Transjordan’s Arab Legion. Its commander was a British officer, Glubb Pasha. The most capable Arab army in the field was not operating under an independent, unified Arab command structure.
King Abdullah of Jordan was focused less on defending Palestine in its entirety than on securing control over the West Bank. His political calculations shaped the limits of engagement.
Israeli society is intoxicated by war and the dream of expansion. It cannot last
Read More »
Jordan’s army was constrained and redirected even while holding ground against Zionist forces, its battlefield momentum subordinated to territorial ambition, rather than deployed in a coordinated Arab strategy.
Egypt’s performance in 1948 was shaped by dysfunction at the highest levels. Under King Farouk, the Egyptian army entered the war poorly prepared, with confused command structures and inadequate coordination.
The infamous “defective weapons” scandal later rocked Cairo, with allegations that soldiers had been supplied with faulty ammunition and unusable arms - a controversy that fuelled public outrage and helped pave the way for the Free Officers’ coup in 1952.
Meanwhile, Palestinian fighters faced an even harsher reality. Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, leading irregular forces around Jerusalem, pleaded repeatedly for weapons and reinforcements that never arrived. Before the Battle of al-Qastal in April 1948, he sent urgent appeals for ammunition.
Two days before his death, he wrote to the secretary general of the Arab League: “I hold you responsible after you have left my soldiers at the height of their victories without support or weapons.”
He and his men fought to the last bullet. He was killed in combat. His forces were not backed by a unified Arab command; they were fighting largely alone.
There was no coordinated, sovereign, unified Arab conventional war machine in 1948. There were fragmented states, rival monarchies, colonial entanglements, competing ambitions, and uneven military capacity.
Israel did not defeat a cohesive pan-Arab army. It emerged in an Arab world still under the shadow - and often the direct influence - of European colonial power structures, while benefitting from superior organisation and international support.
The myth of having “defeated the Arab armies” was later polished into a national legend.
In 1967, Israel’s decisive advantage came from a pre-emptive air strike that destroyed Egypt’s air force on the ground within hours. Once air supremacy was secured, the outcome was largely predetermined. It was not a prolonged, balanced clash between evenly matched armies; it was a paralysing blow delivered before full conventional engagement could unfold.
The 1973 war complicates the myth further. In October of that year, the Egyptian army crossed the Suez Canal, breached the Bar Lev Line, and advanced into Sinai, in a surprise offensive that stunned the Israeli command and punctured the aura of invincibility established in 1967.
For the first time since Israel’s founding, an Arab army demonstrated planning, coordination, and battlefield competence on a scale that forced Israel onto the defensive. Yet the military momentum was not converted into a strategic transformation.
A massive American airlift replenished Israeli losses and stabilised its position, altering the balance once more. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, eager to pivot towards Washington and secure a political settlement, moved quickly into negotiations.
What began as a military shock evolved into a diplomatic realignment, culminating in the Camp David Accords.
Since then, Israel’s principal confrontations have been with non-state actors. In Lebanon, it faced Hezbollah and was forced to withdraw.
In Gaza, despite immense US backing and overwhelming firepower, it has not eliminated Hamas. Hostages were recovered through negotiated deals, not decisive battlefield annihilation.
Israel has grown accustomed to aerial bombardment against fragmented opponents, not sustained, attritional warfare against a large, organised army backed by unified political leadership.
How Iran war may accelerate the fall of US empire
This conflict could prove to be Washington's most perilous adventure yet - the classic story of a superpower overreaching
www.middleeasteye.net
comrade stalin
moscow
