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George H W Bush


The present President Bush has stated that he holds more in common with Ronald Reagan (in the realm of foreign policy) than he does with his father George HW Bush.  One assumes the father, whom I remember as the more urbane and pragmatic international diplomat (with years serving as CIA director as well as a number of other posts) would be more of the diplomat in international relations.


Interestingly enough, Bush 41 thought Reagan’s administration had become too “passive” and “conciliatory” towards the USSR.  They feared Gorbachev had created an excellent political opportunity with perestroika and would use it to manipulate a change in the alliance.  He was right of course.  If DC did not gain the advantage things with the alliance could fall apart.


So Bush 41 moved the goal posts.  It ceased being an issue of arms control, they wanted to redefine the field.  A broader pull back of the Soviet Union and their power became the new foreign policy.  Liberalization became the new policy by word.  One key aspect of that foreign policy was German re-unification.  The new rhetoric was not lost on the USSR and Shevardnadze asked Genscher about the new rhetoric.  “Why”, he asked, “was Bush fanning the flames against East Germany?”  Even before the fall, the US had taken an aggressive stance.  And once the Berlin Wall fell, it was seen as an important goal for German unification.  Indeed, the US post Berlin Wall policy was not new, but a continuation of an already managed program.  German ambitions for reunification was heavily questioned by US allies.  How quickly could West Germany absorb the East?  What guarantees would the other European states have against a united Germany?  This was a question pushed forward with great enthusiasm by France, which did not want to see a united Germany.  On all of these questions, the US took an opposite stance to all of the other allies AND the USSR.


Mitterand had told Bush that German reunification would put Europe back to 1913, on the eve of war.  Since no European country favored reunification, it was NOT on the agenda.  Even Thatcher saw Germany as a naturally destabilizing force in Europe.  She stated that before anything else was done, East Germany had to have a sustainable working democracy.


It would have been easy for the US to go along with these views.  After all, Germany had little policy influence in Europe.  Indeed Bush told both Thatcher and Gorbachev that they would not be reckless regarding reunification (December 1989), a month later the US put the pedal to the metal with reunification.  Neither Gorbachev or anyone else was advised of the change.  So why did the US go against the grain?


1-The US, unlike the rest of Europe saw a growing chaos and social unrest in East Germany.  They needed a stalking horse.

2-Most Europeans thought they could get adequate guarantees by blocking reunification. 

3-Germans would eventually become resentful of not being allowed full reunification by foreigners, when such a possibility was open.  Germans knew saw themselves as being considered second class status.  Thus Germany would have created a more belligerent state when reunification finally came about.

4-Polls showed 58% of all Germans wanted to withdraw from both alliances (which deepened US concern).


Of course the US did not openly state its desire to ignore everyone.  There was the “two plus four” framework whose purpose was to fashion a satisfactory conclusion for both the German states and the World War II victors.  It was a brilliant illusion.   Not one significant process regarding the slow down of reunification passed.  By keeping the major powers of Europe from uniting (through the “Two Plus Four”) the US was able to see its process through without having to expend a great deal of political capital or alienation.  Finally the USSR put forth, in one last attempt, the idea that Germany should remain, for an indefinite transitional period, a member of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO.  But despite the desires of England and the USSR the US allowed no constraints.  Some measures were drawn up to reassure both the USSR and other allies, but they tended to be vague promises.


The US achieved its goals.  It kept Germany as an ally.  It kept Germany within NATO.  The unification of Germany is viewed as a masterpiece of the diplomatic art, a brilliant response.  But not because the leaders of nations worked in harmony or even together.  It worked because the European countries were suspicious of each other, fearful and divided.  The US was able to steer Europe in the right direction and used their partners disarray and US deception to provide the best outcome.


During this period Condoleezza  Rice stated that the “the main lesson was to select optimal goals even if they seem politically infeasible at the time.”  In a major negotiation among many players who are all vying for different goals, single mindedness is a huge asset.  For Rice, a government that “knows what it wants has a reasonable chance of getting it.”


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