I have written this before and it bears repeating.
Ronald Reagan
Reagan brought about confrontation with the USSR during in the Cold War. It increased public fear of nuclear holocaust, indeed there were a number of protests and movies ("The Day After" and "AMERIKA" among others) that found their ways into society during those years. Probably the clearest illustration is the confrontation between the US and USSR on European soil over intermediate range nuclear missiles in the 1980's. The USSR had moved its SS-20 nuclear missile force into Europe. NATO believed that a viable defense would be to have comparable range (and capability) and made the "dual track" decision in 1979 for deploying American intermediate range nuclear force (INF) with the open invitation to the USSR to negotiate the issue down. It was an attempt to sustain the policy of d�tente that was built in the 1970's.
Reagan liked the missiles. But his view was not de'tente. In fact d'tente was viewed as a losing proposition (it was). Reagan felt that restoring nuclear parity should not be a support of d�tente but a reason to throw the policy of d'tente out the window. George Schultz, who was secretary of state at the time saw d'tente as a misguided failure. He believed cooperation with the USSR did not restrain the USSR in the least. They still involved themselves in a number of different "ventures". While Carter began the aid to the Afghan fighters, Reagan took it to another level. Resistance to the USSR became a program for global support for insurgencies against the USSR. Simultaneously Reagan used the human rights issues to question the very legitimacy of the USSR and its system of oppression. He turned up the pressure.
Reagan and US allies did agree on the 1981 INF negotiating position of "zero option", in which it eliminated all Soviet and US intermediate range missiles. But the reasoning by the Reagan administration was quite different. Reagan liked the idea of the USSR having to forfeit its "new missiles", while the allies looked at it as a neutralized political position. Here we also see a very different stance between that of a Super Power and that of other nations, Europe specifically. To Europe all things are political and neutralized political positions are the same as neutralized military positions. Hard and soft power were not well defined concepts in those days. Most of the Euro leaders at the time thought the US had to show good faith for the negotiations to work. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany thought the deployments would not work "politically" unless the US could show some type of negotiating stance. The US would HAVE TO COMPROMISE.
Alas Helmut Schmidt would not survive the Euromissile issue. His coalition partners (the Free Democrats) brought down the West Germany government. Helmut Kohl was made the new Chancellor. But even Kohl of the on his first trip to Washington told Reagan the negotiations had to be real and "not a show". Margaret Thatcher stated much the same. Even the US national security leaders were divided. State Department, many thought could not keep up the non-negotiable position. Nitze, who was the US negotiation on INF thought the entire thing would collapse without European sanction, specifically German sanction (where the weapons would be located). He wanted a compromise, "parity". Reagan disallowed it. Reagan once told Nize to inform the Soviets "you work for one tough son of a *****". In fact Reagan did not even inform the allies that Nize had broached a compromise plan (it was later leaked through the papers ( some things never change). Reagan thought success depended on "inflexibility". Another "parity" decision, which left the USSR with most of their desires was not the way to win. Caspar Weinberger stated "The alliance needs leadership, not compromise".
VP Bush went to Europe to seek a constructive sounding note with "compromise" and a meeting with Yuri Andropov, but the point of the meeting was only to accept "zero option". On top of that SDI made its debut, thus showing how far a field US policy had gone sine the 1981 NATO negotiations had started.
What I find interesting, and also a sign of continuity in regard to European US relationship was the reaction of the hoi poloi in Europe. The USSR had begun the confrontation with a Soviet buildup. The rhetoric of the USSR was much worse and more dangerous than the US. But the focus of the protests were against the US. Some of the largest political demonstrations in post Vietnam history occurred during that period. The Dutch vote for deployment was canceled when the Dutch realized they did not have the votes. Italy's Prime Minister also broke rank with the US. It seemed there was a general "deep desperation" (per George Schultz) among European leaders. In 1986 the Germans saw it as unrelenting and the US as an uncompromising country leading us all down chaos.
Sound familiar?
US policy held. Thatcher and Kohl both were able to keep their positions and push forward with the "zero option" plan. After Reagan's re-election the USSR came back to the table and negotiated. Two years later Gorbachev signed the "zero option" treaty. Soon after perestroika began and the USSR collapsed. Gorbachev always downplayed the idea that US pressure led to the collapse. But he was willing to admit that it did produce "new" directions in Soviet foreign policy. The turning point, Gorbachev stated, was the lost battle with NATO over nuclear missiles in Europe.
Ronald Reagan
Reagan brought about confrontation with the USSR during in the Cold War. It increased public fear of nuclear holocaust, indeed there were a number of protests and movies ("The Day After" and "AMERIKA" among others) that found their ways into society during those years. Probably the clearest illustration is the confrontation between the US and USSR on European soil over intermediate range nuclear missiles in the 1980's. The USSR had moved its SS-20 nuclear missile force into Europe. NATO believed that a viable defense would be to have comparable range (and capability) and made the "dual track" decision in 1979 for deploying American intermediate range nuclear force (INF) with the open invitation to the USSR to negotiate the issue down. It was an attempt to sustain the policy of d�tente that was built in the 1970's.
Reagan liked the missiles. But his view was not de'tente. In fact d'tente was viewed as a losing proposition (it was). Reagan felt that restoring nuclear parity should not be a support of d�tente but a reason to throw the policy of d'tente out the window. George Schultz, who was secretary of state at the time saw d'tente as a misguided failure. He believed cooperation with the USSR did not restrain the USSR in the least. They still involved themselves in a number of different "ventures". While Carter began the aid to the Afghan fighters, Reagan took it to another level. Resistance to the USSR became a program for global support for insurgencies against the USSR. Simultaneously Reagan used the human rights issues to question the very legitimacy of the USSR and its system of oppression. He turned up the pressure.
Reagan and US allies did agree on the 1981 INF negotiating position of "zero option", in which it eliminated all Soviet and US intermediate range missiles. But the reasoning by the Reagan administration was quite different. Reagan liked the idea of the USSR having to forfeit its "new missiles", while the allies looked at it as a neutralized political position. Here we also see a very different stance between that of a Super Power and that of other nations, Europe specifically. To Europe all things are political and neutralized political positions are the same as neutralized military positions. Hard and soft power were not well defined concepts in those days. Most of the Euro leaders at the time thought the US had to show good faith for the negotiations to work. Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany thought the deployments would not work "politically" unless the US could show some type of negotiating stance. The US would HAVE TO COMPROMISE.
Alas Helmut Schmidt would not survive the Euromissile issue. His coalition partners (the Free Democrats) brought down the West Germany government. Helmut Kohl was made the new Chancellor. But even Kohl of the on his first trip to Washington told Reagan the negotiations had to be real and "not a show". Margaret Thatcher stated much the same. Even the US national security leaders were divided. State Department, many thought could not keep up the non-negotiable position. Nitze, who was the US negotiation on INF thought the entire thing would collapse without European sanction, specifically German sanction (where the weapons would be located). He wanted a compromise, "parity". Reagan disallowed it. Reagan once told Nize to inform the Soviets "you work for one tough son of a *****". In fact Reagan did not even inform the allies that Nize had broached a compromise plan (it was later leaked through the papers ( some things never change). Reagan thought success depended on "inflexibility". Another "parity" decision, which left the USSR with most of their desires was not the way to win. Caspar Weinberger stated "The alliance needs leadership, not compromise".
VP Bush went to Europe to seek a constructive sounding note with "compromise" and a meeting with Yuri Andropov, but the point of the meeting was only to accept "zero option". On top of that SDI made its debut, thus showing how far a field US policy had gone sine the 1981 NATO negotiations had started.
What I find interesting, and also a sign of continuity in regard to European US relationship was the reaction of the hoi poloi in Europe. The USSR had begun the confrontation with a Soviet buildup. The rhetoric of the USSR was much worse and more dangerous than the US. But the focus of the protests were against the US. Some of the largest political demonstrations in post Vietnam history occurred during that period. The Dutch vote for deployment was canceled when the Dutch realized they did not have the votes. Italy's Prime Minister also broke rank with the US. It seemed there was a general "deep desperation" (per George Schultz) among European leaders. In 1986 the Germans saw it as unrelenting and the US as an uncompromising country leading us all down chaos.
Sound familiar?
US policy held. Thatcher and Kohl both were able to keep their positions and push forward with the "zero option" plan. After Reagan's re-election the USSR came back to the table and negotiated. Two years later Gorbachev signed the "zero option" treaty. Soon after perestroika began and the USSR collapsed. Gorbachev always downplayed the idea that US pressure led to the collapse. But he was willing to admit that it did produce "new" directions in Soviet foreign policy. The turning point, Gorbachev stated, was the lost battle with NATO over nuclear missiles in Europe.