William Jefferson Clinton
Clinton believed, like Reagan and Bush that prior administrations had been inadequate to the threats that had been raised in the world.
Sound familiar?
Clinton wanted a more ambitious policy in regard to the Balkans. Without something stronger he felt nothing would happen. Clinton had wanted to help the Bosnian Muslims and put more pressure on the Serbs. But chose not to risk a breach with his European allies.
It soon became clear however, that not even the minimal goals would be achieved. Merely choosing not to argue with allies was insufficient to prevent various crisis. In 1995 with the winter ceasefire expiring and a Bosnian Serb offensive anticipated and likely to lead to mass killings, Clinton decided to break with the allies. Clinton decided to part with Europe in viewing Bosnia as a containable second tier issue were second best results were acceptable. Clinton decided to use the same tactics both Reagan and Bush used. He would go his own way and inform Europe what he was going to do, after he made the decision.
Clinton told his advisors “We have to seize control of this”. The status quo was “doing enormous damage to US standing in the world” (again, sound familiar?). Clinton stopped listening to NATO allies and chose to deliberate internally and then send senior officials to the EU capitals to inform them of the presidents decision. Allies acquiescence was expected. US national security advisor Anthony Lake was, “the big dog”, and on an issue this important, the smaller dogs would surely follow, as long as the United States set the example.
Clinton enhanced the substance to the Balkan issue. Containing instability was not the option. Instead an end state would be achieved without the status quo. In other words the most desirable outcome of states in the area would be put forward and the reverse engineered to find out what policy steps needed to be taken UNILATERALLY by the US. The contrast with European policy was stark. The French were also preparing to involve themselves, but only to defend peacekeepers already in place. The purpose of Europe’s so called “rapid reaction force” was not a bold new strategy, but to shore up an old failed one.
The US began its new policy by calling for negotiations. But the Clinton Administration told both its allies and warring parties that if there was no peaceful solution was QUICKLY accepted by all sides, it would become coercive. This included training and arms for Bosnian Muslims and air strikes to rebel Serb advances, removal of peacekeepers (so NATO or more correctly the US could work unhampered). Such a quick timetable was reflective of the INF action. Americans proposed negotiation but did not expect it to work and took the steps to ensure it would. In fact plans had been written up well ahead of time (much as they were with Iraq). Dayton ceased being about maintaining order (as originally planned) and encompassed a mandate of social reconstruction and the establishment of states. In short, nation building.
Clinton employed the same action when he confronted Miloslovec four years later. Clinton would not allow Miloslovec to exploit negotiations to deflect pressure (again similarities abound). Diplomacy alone was bound for failure. A leader with one genocide on his record was not entitled to the benefit of a doubt. The war then proceded without the normal �pro forma� round of deliberations in NATO. US goals were not to squeeze incremental improvement. It was to change the field completely.
When the bombing campaign failed to produce a quick success, and Clinton was criticized for providing inadequate rationale for war (see comparisons with �Wag the Dog� during the Monica Lewinsky period), also for failure to anticipate the course of the war, and for making the status quo worse (does all of this sound familiar to anyone?). Despite the discord with the state department, some early reverses, and an acute humanitarian crisis created by the war, the US continue to push forward.
In fact allied suggestions for a bombing pause were ignored. Chancellor Schroeder stated Germany would block an invastion, the Clinton administration countered that such objections would not prevail, there was a reference to a coalition of those willing to take part if necessary. Only Miloslovec’s unconditional surrender saved Clinton from rolling over European dissent in the matter. US aims in the Balkans continued to escalate, and regime change was called for.
Comparisons
So for the past 25 years American presidents have, with amazing regularity acted in the same fundamental way. The US would see the status quo, and realize that it was not helping. In fact that the status quo often with hindsight was seen as deteriorating the entire situation in a strategic region. The US rejected approaches that often took incremental paths that often led nowhere. Its desire was to create a stronger and better international framework, one which did not lead to the constant erosion of both western and US power. So the US in the last 25 years unlike the UN tended to meet problems head on rather than manage them and allow them to fester. And while negotiations have frequently been used in the process (Reagan with INF, Bush 41 with reunification, Clinton in Bosnia [both Dayton and Ramboullet] and Bush 43 with the UN in Iraq), the end result was not management, but specific goals which changed the strategic field and created more favorable “facts on the ground”. Now this has bothered many allies and certainly gives fodder to the many anti-Americans, but policymakers have been ready to pay the price for these things. As Madeline Albright stated “We see further than other countries into the future”.
