It's "Stay The Course??"-Time, For A New Generation!!

Mr. Shaman

Well-Known Member
Nov 27, 2007
Our Military has spoken....and, they're waiting for a response.​
"Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal says emphatically: "Failure to gain the initiative and reverse insurgent momentum in the near-term (next 12 months) -- while Afghan security capacity matures -- risks an outcome where defeating the insurgency is no longer possible."

His assessment was sent to Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates on Aug. 30 and is now being reviewed by President Obama and his national security team.

McChrystal concludes the document's five-page Commander's Summary on a note of muted optimism: "While the situation is serious, success is still achievable."

But he repeatedly warns that without more forces and the rapid implementation of a genuine counterinsurgency strategy, defeat is likely. McChrystal describes an Afghan government riddled with corruption and an international force undermined by tactics that alienate civilians."
What an IDEAL time to have Neil Sheehan, on Q&A!!!!!! (Transcript & video, pending.)​

"John Paul Vann became an adviser to the Saigon regime in the early 1960s. He was an ardent critic of how the war was fought, both on the part of the Saigon regime, which he viewed as corrupt and incompetent, and, as time went by, increasingly, on the part of the U.S. military. In particular, he was critical of the U.S. military command, especially under William Westmoreland, and their inability to adapt to the fact that they were facing a popular guerrilla movement while backing a corrupt regime. He argued that many of the tactics employed (for example the strategic hamlet relocation) further alienated the population and thus were counterproductive to U.S. objectives. When being unable to influence the military command, he often used the Saigon press corps, Neil Sheehan, David Halberstam and Malcolm Browne among them, to leak his views."


"When a 26-year-old Sheehan first arrived in Saigon as a reporter in April 1962, there were only a dozen full-time resident correspondents and fewer than 5,000 United States military men in the country. At that time the war was still an adventure, and the Communist-led Vietcong seemed a nuisance that the Army of South Vietnam, with American guidance, could easily subdue. The Pentagon's worst-case scenario called for victory by 1965 at the latest, with no more than 1,600 Americans still in the country. (By 1965 there would be almost 185,000, and by 1969 543,000.) But not all the American advisers to the South Vietnamese Army shared this optimism. Among the most outspoken of the skeptics was John Paul Vann, a lieutenant colonel who had served with distinction in the Korean War and arrived in Vietnam shortly before Mr. Sheehan."