Obama is a weak president. Hes even weaker than Jimmy Carter

[GBFan]

see I am waiting for something in the real world

1. so your plan is some vague plan that takes 5 years with no real plan...also called over 5 years hope...

2. NATO does not just make Ukraine a member after the fact , so we can then go war. Fist its childish and pointless to try to change things after the fact. 2nd Ukraine has not suggested, in fact has said it does not want to Join NATO.

3. Missile defense really? do you even have a clue about it? Would missles stop any trucks full of troops? Nope, would not change anything. And the shield was to protect the EU from Iran...Russia would destroy that shield in a quick attack or just simply overpower it easily. The reason we did not put it up in the first place was lack of confidence it could even do that with...ask Robert Gates...

4. again your plan is to talk to 2 others about something 5 years down the road,,,

Man your realy hitting Russia hard with your nothing nothing and nothing in 5 years.

See? This is exactly what I'm talking about .... talking with you is like walking thru a puddle ... it never gets very deep, and when you're done, you just feel dirty.

1) Applying pressure is different than you seem to conceive ... Putin knows that his only thread is energy. If it is threatened, he has to back down ... his economy will not withstand the threat, much less the action. He has to retrench in order to protect what he has today. If he pushes against the threat, he cannot win.

2) You need to just be quiet when it comes to issues of military superiority and deployment. Clearly, you don't have a single clue about how it works. Would missiles stop trucks? Duh. As a matter of fact, they will. Since we also have a superior air force located in the immediate area (33 minutes flying time from Kiev), you can be assured that any move toward the missile defense sites would result in the complete, and absolute, destruction of the invading force. It is 334 km from Kiev to the nearest Russian border (forget about where their troops are housed) ... that means the invasion force would have to travel approximately 100 km/hr to arrive the same time the F-22's do. Your scenario is pure fantasy, wrapped in ignorance.

3) Again, your lack of depth of knowledge about Europe fails you. If you recall .... and I'm sure you don't ... Obama gave away placing missile defense systems in Poland and Estonia. They were NOT to protect anybody from Iran ... their sole purpose was to intimidate Russia with the threat of destroying their missiles before they got to their target. I am well aware that Obama said the purpose of the system was to protect Poland from Iranian missiles, but given that Iran didn't have any missiles that would travel that far, has shown no interest in moving in that direction, and oh by the way, if you look at the positioning of the missile batteries, you will find that they are directly on the launch paths of known Russian missile sites. Tell me ... why would you place missile batteries in northern Poland (you know, close to Russia), if you were trying to protect Poland from Iran, which, surprisingly, is southwest of Poland? Wouldn't logic dictate that you place the missiles on the SOUTHERN border?? You really need to quit reading the first two sentences of the latest Wikipedia posting, and then anointing yourself an expert.

4) As for your prattling about NATO ... that is exactly what NATO does ... and has done several times in the past. If they vote the Ukraine into NATO, it is a commitment by the member states to defend Ukranian soil as it were their own. Get out a map --- we'll wait.

Ask yourself one simple question ... why did Russia intrude on the Ukraine, rather than the much more vulnerable Belarus? Belarus has a significantly smaller military, is much closer to Moscow and Russian military centers, and has a much larger proportional citizenry of Russian descent (the weak ass excuse that allows Obama to hide)?

The answer is simple. Belarus is a member of NATO, and attacking them would have forced NATO countries to respond. By going after Crimea, establishing a strategic and tactical foothold to push into the Ukraine, Putin only had to worry about Obama ... and he already knew that Obama had no balls.

 

[GBFan]

Poland has begun campaigning in favour of an EU energy union in order to reduce the bloc's dependence on Russian supplies, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Tuesday.

"We're pursuing efforts both on the diplomatic front and on an expert level in Brussels," he told reporters, before laying out six concrete proposals.

"The Ukraine context... means that the question of energy independence, not just of Poland but of the entire continent, is starting to take on an importance that extends beyond the economic factor."

The EU member, which shares a border with Ukraine and is Central Europe's largest economy, currently relies on imports, mainly from Russia, for two-thirds of the natural gas it consumes.

According to Tusk, 10 EU members are heavily dependent on Russian gas, including some whose reliance reaches 100 percent.

He said Warsaw would present half a dozen proposals to its partners in the 28-nation European Union on how to increase their energy security, including through common energy purchases.

The announcement comes a week after EU Council President Herman Van Rompuy said the bloc's leaders had agreed to outline an energy security framework at their next top-level meeting in June.

Poland will also suggest that the EU encourage new energy suppliers, notably the United States.

"Once the US decides to export its shale gas, the situation on the global energy market, especially in Europe, will change dramatically. This will not only increase security but also promote lower prices," Tusk said.

He also reiterated Poland's resolve to continue mining coal, a key pillar of its energy strategy.

 

[BigRob]

See? This is exactly what I'm talking about .... talking with you is like walking thru a puddle ... it never gets very deep, and when you're done, you just feel dirty.

2) You need to just be quiet when it comes to issues of military superiority and deployment. Clearly, you don't have a single clue about how it works. Would missiles stop trucks? Duh. As a matter of fact, they will. Since we also have a superior air force located in the immediate area (33 minutes flying time from Kiev), you can be assured that any move toward the missile defense sites would result in the complete, and absolute, destruction of the invading force. It is 334 km from Kiev to the nearest Russian border (forget about where their troops are housed) ... that means the invasion force would have to travel approximately 100 km/hr to arrive the same time the F-22's do. Your scenario is pure fantasy, wrapped in ignorance.

3) Again, your lack of depth of knowledge about Europe fails you. If you recall .... and I'm sure you don't ... Obama gave away placing missile defense systems in Poland and Estonia. They were NOT to protect anybody from Iran ... their sole purpose was to intimidate Russia with the threat of destroying their missiles before they got to their target. I am well aware that Obama said the purpose of the system was to protect Poland from Iranian missiles, but given that Iran didn't have any missiles that would travel that far, has shown no interest in moving in that direction, and oh by the way, if you look at the positioning of the missile batteries, you will find that they are directly on the launch paths of known Russian missile sites. Tell me ... why would you place missile batteries in northern Poland (you know, close to Russia), if you were trying to protect Poland from Iran, which, surprisingly, is southwest of Poland? Wouldn't logic dictate that you place the missiles on the SOUTHERN border?? You really need to quit reading the first two sentences of the latest Wikipedia posting, and then anointing yourself an expert.

This will not be a long post since I am doing it on my phone - but these two points are filled with some pretty glaring false statements.

1) The missiles that were slated to be deployed to Poland were 10 GMD interceptors. These are designed to intercept a missile strike during the midcourse phase, and are not designed to be turned against "trucks" on the ground - not to mention, there were only going to be 10 of them.

2) The Poland site was intended as one layer of an overall system that would protect NATO capitals (not just Poland) from Iranian missile strikes. Iran does possess (and did before) missiles that are capable of reaching NATO capitals - they had these even before President Obama scrapped the Poland site.

The idea that the 10 GMD interceptors posed any threat to a Russian capability is entirely laughable.

 

[GBFan]

This will not be a long post since I am doing it on my phone - but these two points are filled with some pretty glaring false statements.

1) The missiles that were slated to be deployed to Poland were 10 GMD interceptors. These are designed to intercept a missile strike during the midcourse phase, and are not designed to be turned against "trucks" on the ground - not to mention, there were only going to be 10 of them.

2) The Poland site was intended as one layer of an overall system that would protect NATO capitals (not just Poland) from Iranian missile strikes. Iran does possess (and did before) missiles that are capable of reaching NATO capitals - they had these even before President Obama scrapped the Poland site.

The idea that the 10 GMD interceptors posed any threat to a Russian capability is entirely laughable.

See? This is what happens when you don't do your research ....

I will explain what really happened, but first, I want to correct a misconception that you perpetrating. You state that the missiles slated to be deployed are 10 GMD interceptors, as if this is a particular weapon system. It isn't .. in fact, GMD stands for Ground Missile Defense, which is an operational concept. Within the context of 'GMD interceptors' is a whole litany of available systems. You have to look at the specific system selected in order to intuit the mission intent.

1) You are confusing your preconceived answer with the question. The question asked was whether missiles will stop trucks .. of course, they will. How about Stingers (the most widely known weapon)? Because the individual had no clue what he was talking about, I think we answered the question. Now, you assume that he was asking if the anti-missile systems will stop trucks. You're probably not familiar with where the Patriot systems came from. They were originally built as anti-aircraft interceptors, and were modified to be used against ground vehicles. THEN, they were further modified (by changing the kill vehicle) to intercept missiles. So, the response is valid ... we have missiles that will kill trucks. The Patriot CAN be used to kill ground vehicles, with the appropriate change of kill vehicles, but frankly, that's a waste of good weapon power.

2) You have bought into liberal rhetoric. Let's revisit reality.

It is agreed that Iran currently has no launch vehicle capability to deliver a weapon onto Eastern European capitals, nor do they have a valid development program in place to create one. There appears to be some back-channel conversations ongoing with the North Koreans, but given the quality of their missile program (they use Chinese made vehicles, modified for their own warheads), that is not considered a viable threat. The Longdong missile (the Chinese long range vehicle) has shown a remarkable propensity for blowing up on the launch pad or immediately on launch.

"Iran’s acquisition of ballistic-missile technologies began in the mid-1980s, when it purchased a limited number of liquid-fuelled, Scud-Bs from several foreign sources to satisfy an immediate wartime need. The perceived success of Scud-B missile attacks during its war with Iraq led Iran to purchase additional 300km-range Scud-Bs (Shahab-1), 500km-range Scud-Cs (Shahab-2), and longer-range No-dong (Shahab-3) missiles from North Korea, beginning in the late 1980s and extending to the mid-1990s. Based on the number of imports, it is estimated that Iran today has approximately 200–300 Shahab-1 and -2 missiles capable of reaching targets in neighbouring countries. Iran can also hit targets about 900 km from its borders using the Shahab-3, which has a nominal payload of 1,000kg and was commissioned in mid-2003. A modified version of the Shahab-3, the Ghadr-1, which began flight tests in 2004, theoretically extends Iran’s reach to about 1,600km, but with a smaller, 750kg warhead. Information available within the public domain suggests that Iran has approximately six Shahab-3/Ghadr-1 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) vehicles and between 12 and 18 Shahab-1/-2 TELs, although this number may be growing." https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic dossiers/issues/iran--39-s-ballistic-missile-capabilities--a-net-assessment-885a

If you are able to sift thru all that gobbledygook, you'll see that the Iranian missile programs pose no threat whatsoever to Eastern Europe capitals. Keep in mind that the SCUDs couldn't even make it from Iraq to Israel with any accuracy, and that was while carrying minimal payloads. While they made a lot of noise, and gave CNN something to talk about, they are not a practicable weapon system.

So ... ask yourself .... why would we put a missile system in Poland (and a radar system in the Czech Republic) to protect against a non-existent threat?

"In April 2007, NATO's European allies called for a NATO missile defence system which would complement the American national missile defense system to protect Europe from missile attacks and NATO's decision-making North Atlantic Council held consultations on missile defence in the first meeting on the topic at such a senior level. In response, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin claimed that such a deployment could lead to a new arms race and could enhance the likelihood of mutual destruction. He also suggested that his country would freeze its compliance with the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)—which limits military deployments across the continent—until all NATO countries had ratified the adapted CFE treaty."

Now, ask yourself .... Iran has no viable missile system in place, or under development. A decision is made to deploy a defense shield, anyway. Russia goes crazy ... why would that be? Is that because they wanted Iran to someday (keep in mind we are 10 years into the future now!) to have the ability to deliver warheads on Bonn, Madrid, Rome, Kiev, or Warsaw? Or, is that because Russia recognizes that the missile shield negates their tactical advantage?

"On 17 September 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that the planned deployment of long-range missile defence interceptors and equipment in Poland and the Czech Republic was not to go forward, and that a defence against short- and medium-range missiles using AEGIS warships would be deployed instead. Following the change in plans, Russian President Dimitri Medvedev announced that a proposed Russian Iskander surface to surface missile deployment in nearby Kaliningrad would also not go ahead. The two deployment cancellation announcements were later followed with a statement by newly named NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen calling for a strategic partnership between Russia and the Alliance, explicitly involving technological cooperation of the two parties' missile defence systems."

Put your thinking cap on again ... why would Russia stop its deployment of a surface-to-surface missile system in return for changes in a missile defense system that is purportedly being deployed against Iran's non-existent missile delivery system?? Why would Russia care?

Now, let's tie that all to current events .... if the missile system was intended to protect Warsaw from Iranian missiles, why did Poland, on March 14, announce that they intend to reinvigorate the missile defense system as a direct result of the Ukranian crisis, and are going to immediate acquisition within the next year despite the increased cost of close to $1 billion for expedited deliver?

Ok ... last test.

I agree that the Poland and Czech sites were simply parts of a much larger missile shield. So, does Iran have, or is it ever going to have, a missile capability that would necessitate a defense that covers all of Europe? Or, is there somebody else (Russia, maybe?) that DOES have the capability that must be defensed?

But, I tell ya what ... you go ahead and believe the tripe coming out of the White House. It will make you feel safer ... it just won't make you BE safer.

 

[BigRob]

See? This is what happens when you don't do your research ....

I will explain what really happened, but first, I want to correct a misconception that you perpetrating. You state that the missiles slated to be deployed are 10 GMD interceptors, as if this is a particular weapon system. It isn't .. in fact, GMD stands for Ground Missile Defense, which is an operational concept. Within the context of 'GMD interceptors' is a whole litany of available systems. You have to look at the specific system selected in order to intuit the mission intent.

According to the Missile Defense Agency in the DOD, GMD stands for "Ground-Based Midcourse Defense." It does not mean any missile defense system based on the ground. You are incorrect. The GMD platform is indeed a complex overall platform, but the GMD system is composed of Ground-Based Interceptors and Ground Support & Fire Control Systems components. The Ground based interceptor is a specific platform. It is a multi-stage, solid fuel booster with an EKV payload. We know exactly what this missile is and its already deployed in Alaska and California.

Other ground based systems like PAC-3 and THAAD are terminal defense systems, not midcourse defense systems.

1) You are confusing your preconceived answer with the question. The question asked was whether missiles will stop trucks .. of course, they will. How about Stingers (the most widely known weapon)? Because the individual had no clue what he was talking about, I think we answered the question. Now, you assume that he was asking if the anti-missile systems will stop trucks. You're probably not familiar with where the Patriot systems came from. They were originally built as anti-aircraft interceptors, and were modified to be used against ground vehicles. THEN, they were further modified (by changing the kill vehicle) to intercept missiles. So, the response is valid ... we have missiles that will kill trucks. The Patriot CAN be used to kill ground vehicles, with]the appropriate change of kill vehicles, but frankly, that's a waste of good weapon power.

Ok, obviously we have missiles that can be used to destroy "trucks." But you are moving the goalposts. The missile defense site in Poland that President Obama cancelled was not a patriot site, it was a GMD site, with 10 interceptors to be deployed there. Those missiles are not going to be effective trying to stop a ground attack.

And I am quite well versed on the background of the Patriot system (and other missile defense systems) as several years ago I wrote a Graduate Thesis on the subject.

2) You have bought into liberal rhetoric. Let's revisit reality.

It is agreed that Iran currently has no launch vehicle capability to deliver a weapon onto Eastern European capitals, nor do they have a valid development program in place to create one. There appears to be some back-channel conversations ongoing with the North Koreans, but given the quality of their missile program (they use Chinese made vehicles, modified for their own warheads), that is not considered a viable threat. The Longdong missile (the Chinese long range vehicle) has shown a remarkable propensity for blowing up on the launch pad or immediately on launch.

If you are able to sift thru all that gobbledygook, you'll see that the Iranian missile programs pose no threat whatsoever to Eastern Europe capitals. Keep in mind that the SCUDs couldn't even make it from Iraq to Israel with any accuracy, and that was while carrying minimal payloads. While they made a lot of noise, and gave CNN something to talk about, they are not a practicable weapon system.

Near term Iran threats are limited, but as I stated Iran does possess the capability to strike some NATO capitals with their current technology - and potential future threats should they obtain better weapon systems just makes it worse.

 

[BigRob]

So ... ask yourself .... why would we put a missile system in Poland (and a radar system in the Czech Republic) to protect against a non-existent threat?

Now, ask yourself .... Iran has no viable missile system in place, or under development. A decision is made to deploy a defense shield, anyway. Russia goes crazy ... why would that be? Is that because they wanted Iran to someday (keep in mind we are 10 years into the future now!) to have the ability to deliver warheads on Bonn, Madrid, Rome, Kiev, or Warsaw? Or, is that because Russia recognizes that the missile shield negates their tactical advantage?

Put your thinking cap on again ... why would Russia stop its deployment of a surface-to-surface missile system in return for changes in a missile defense system that is purportedly being deployed against Iran's non-existent missile delivery system?? Why would Russia care?

I examine this very issue in a different piece I wrote several years ago - the relevant section is posted below:

Problems With Russia

As already noted, the Russian reaction to the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was very muted. This trend continued even after President Bush announced his intention to deploy a GMD system. In 2001 Putin again stated,

"I am confident that at least for the coming 25 years American missile defenses will not cause any substantial damage to the national security of Russia. We will reinforce our capability by mounting multiple warheads on our missiles and that will cost us a meager sum. And so, the nuclear arsenal of Russia will be augmented multifold."

As a possible deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic became more likely, Russian objections began to change in tone however. Following the vote in the Upper House of the Czech government approving a radar deployment, and the signing of an agreement with Poland, Russian objections went into high gear. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev commented that, "We will not be hysterical about this, but we will think of retaliatory steps.” Additionally, it was argued that the interceptors could threaten Russian defenses, target Russian missiles, upset strategic stability, start a new arms race, and the radar could be used to spy on Russia. On top of all of that, Russia announced plans to deploy short-range Iskander missiles in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad near Poland as a response to the proposed GMD deployment by the United States, and officially withdrew from the START II Treaty.

The Russian position does have some legitimacy. First, during this time, the MKV was under development, which would, at least in theory, have put multiple kill vehicles on one interceptor, however this would not have really been a threat in the short term to Russia. A GBI, even if equipped with an MKV, would not result in multiple missile kills per interceptor. Rather, especially if used against a Russian missile, it would use all its kill vehicles to eliminate countermeasures and decoys, thus still resulting in a one interceptor for one missile scenario.

That said, the idea that a ten interceptor deployment would be sufficient for a long-term defense against a possible Iranian launch seems short-sighted. When Iran develops IRBM and ICBM capability, it stands to reason that they will eventually be capable of producing more than ten of these missiles. At that point, assuming a 100% success rate, a mere eleven missiles would exhaust and overwhelm the entire Polish site. In such a scenario, more missiles would need to be added to the Polish site, or large costly deployments of theatre systems and Aegis ships would need to be added. If more missiles are not added in this scenario, then the United States is left with a costly missile defense system that effectively is worthless.

Putting this aside, the remainder of Russian objections are simply ridiculous. The idea that such a deployment would be any threat to Russian missiles is laughable. As of Janurary 2009, Russia had hundreds of missiles and almost 3,000 warheads. Even a deployment of fifty interceptors would not have a major impact of that capability. Additionally, the idea that the deployment of a GMD system will result in an arms race seems equally outrageous. If an arms race was to occur, it would be logical to assume that it would occur when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and moved forward on BMD deployments. However, an examination of the Russian nuclear arsenal shows that from 2002 to 2009, there have been large reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal. For example, the overall number of strategic carriers, as well as warheads have gone down by about 50%. This hardly seems like the action a state would take if they felt directly threatened, or had concerns that their strategic forces would be rendered irrelevant. Certainly it would be tough for Russia to maintain its nuclear arsenal over this time period regardless, however it would seem that such drastic reductions would be slowed if they viewed missile defense as a direct threat.

The Russian withdrawal from START II is equally as meaningless. Article I of START II states,

“The aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.”

Even after a withdrawal from the treaty, the Russian military remains in compliance with these numbers, making its withdrawal mostly symbolic. Additionally, SORT (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions) was signed in 2002 and entered force in 2003, and stated that both parties agreed to limit their nuclear arsenal to 1700–2200 operationally deployed warheads each. While this treaty has some verification problems, there is nothing to indicate that any nuclear buildup is occurring within Russia due to the development and deployment of a BMD system.

Now, let's tie that all to current events .... if the missile system was intended to protect Warsaw from Iranian missiles, why did Poland, on March 14, announce that they intend to reinvigorate the missile defense system as a direct result of the Ukranian crisis, and are going to immediate acquisition within the next year despite the increased cost of close to $1 billion for expedited deliver?

The missile defense system was not solely meant to protect Poland from Iranian missiles. I think it is quite clear why Poland wants to reinvigorate a missile defense system and build even stronger ties with the West and against Russia after recent actions in Crimea.

Ok ... last test.

I agree that the Poland and Czech sites were simply parts of a much larger missile shield. So, does Iran have, or is it ever going to have, a missile capability that would necessitate a defense that covers all of Europe? Or, is there somebody else (Russia, maybe?) that DOES have the capability that must be defensed?

Yes - I believe Iran will ultimately have this capability. You still have to be insane to believe 10 GBI's are going to stop a Russian missile attack. That is not a defense by any stretch of the imagination.

But, I tell ya what ... you go ahead and believe the tripe coming out of the White House. It will make you feel safer ... it just won't make you BE safer.

I don't even know what this means.

 

[GBFan]

I examine this very issue in a different piece I wrote several years ago - the relevant section is posted below:

Problems With Russia

As already noted, the Russian reaction to the American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was very muted. This trend continued even after President Bush announced his intention to deploy a GMD system. In 2001 Putin again stated,

"I am confident that at least for the coming 25 years American missile defenses will not cause any substantial damage to the national security of Russia. We will reinforce our capability by mounting multiple warheads on our missiles and that will cost us a meager sum. And so, the nuclear arsenal of Russia will be augmented multifold."

As a possible deployment to Poland and the Czech Republic became more likely, Russian objections began to change in tone however. Following the vote in the Upper House of the Czech government approving a radar deployment, and the signing of an agreement with Poland, Russian objections went into high gear. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev commented that, "We will not be hysterical about this, but we will think of retaliatory steps.” Additionally, it was argued that the interceptors could threaten Russian defenses, target Russian missiles, upset strategic stability, start a new arms race, and the radar could be used to spy on Russia. On top of all of that, Russia announced plans to deploy short-range Iskander missiles in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad near Poland as a response to the proposed GMD deployment by the United States, and officially withdrew from the START II Treaty.

The Russian position does have some legitimacy. First, during this time, the MKV was under development, which would, at least in theory, have put multiple kill vehicles on one interceptor, however this would not have really been a threat in the short term to Russia. A GBI, even if equipped with an MKV, would not result in multiple missile kills per interceptor. Rather, especially if used against a Russian missile, it would use all its kill vehicles to eliminate countermeasures and decoys, thus still resulting in a one interceptor for one missile scenario.

That said, the idea that a ten interceptor deployment would be sufficient for a long-term defense against a possible Iranian launch seems short-sighted. When Iran develops IRBM and ICBM capability, it stands to reason that they will eventually be capable of producing more than ten of these missiles. At that point, assuming a 100% success rate, a mere eleven missiles would exhaust and overwhelm the entire Polish site. In such a scenario, more missiles would need to be added to the Polish site, or large costly deployments of theatre systems and Aegis ships would need to be added. If more missiles are not added in this scenario, then the United States is left with a costly missile defense system that effectively is worthless.

Putting this aside, the remainder of Russian objections are simply ridiculous. The idea that such a deployment would be any threat to Russian missiles is laughable. As of Janurary 2009, Russia had hundreds of missiles and almost 3,000 warheads. Even a deployment of fifty interceptors would not have a major impact of that capability. Additionally, the idea that the deployment of a GMD system will result in an arms race seems equally outrageous. If an arms race was to occur, it would be logical to assume that it would occur when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty and moved forward on BMD deployments. However, an examination of the Russian nuclear arsenal shows that from 2002 to 2009, there have been large reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal. For example, the overall number of strategic carriers, as well as warheads have gone down by about 50%. This hardly seems like the action a state would take if they felt directly threatened, or had concerns that their strategic forces would be rendered irrelevant. Certainly it would be tough for Russia to maintain its nuclear arsenal over this time period regardless, however it would seem that such drastic reductions would be slowed if they viewed missile defense as a direct threat.

The Russian withdrawal from START II is equally as meaningless. Article I of START II states,

“The aggregate number for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, a number between 3800 and 4250 or such lower number as each Party shall decide for itself, but in no case shall such number exceed 4250.”

Even after a withdrawal from the treaty, the Russian military remains in compliance with these numbers, making its withdrawal mostly symbolic. Additionally, SORT (Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions) was signed in 2002 and entered force in 2003, and stated that both parties agreed to limit their nuclear arsenal to 1700–2200 operationally deployed warheads each. While this treaty has some verification problems, there is nothing to indicate that any nuclear buildup is occurring within Russia due to the development and deployment of a BMD system.

The missile defense system was not solely meant to protect Poland from Iranian missiles. I think it is quite clear why Poland wants to reinvigorate a missile defense system and build even stronger ties with the West and against Russia after recent actions in Crimea.



Yes - I believe Iran will ultimately have this capability. You still have to be insane to believe 10 GBI's are going to stop a Russian missile attack. That is not a defense by any stretch of the imagination.



I don't even know what this means.

I particularly enjoy the way you downplay the Patriot battery capacity - trying to make it appear that there only 10 missiles, when in fact, we know that the Patriot has variable launch packages consisting of up to 16 launch vehicles. So, potentially, the kill capacity of the deployment is as much as 160 missiles, rather than the 10 that you cavalierly dismiss. Then, of course, you write that (based on 100% success rate), as few as 11 missiles could disable the system, while conveniently failing to recognize the ability of the Patriot system to protect itself. Frankly, given the targeting capability of the Russian missile programs, the probability of success is much closer to zero, particularly when you consider the defensive capability of the Patriot system.

As for your assumption that the Pole/Czech deployment was a stand-alone intended to protect those areas, that is counter-intuitive to your comments earlier that it is part of a multi-layered defense system. Thus, any discussion about 'taking out' the "10 systems" is misleading in that it does not discuss the impact of the other system elements once the system is attacked.

"The missile defense system was not solely meant to protect Poland from Iranian missiles. I think it is quite clear why Poland wants to reinvigorate a missile defense system and build even stronger ties with the West and against Russia after recent actions in Crimea."

... and you posit this is a new situation? That the Poles didn't know this threat existed before Crimea? Seriously?

Next time you're in town, come on down to Foggy Bottom - I'll show you. It would seem that your information is very dated, and doesn't begin to reflect the true system configuration, and more importantly, its true and current capability.

 

[BigRob]

I particularly enjoy the way you downplay the Patriot battery capacity - trying to make it appear that there only 10 missiles, when in fact, we know that the Patriot has variable launch packages consisting of up to 16 launch vehicles. So, potentially, the kill capacity of the deployment is as much as 160 missiles, rather than the 10 that you cavalierly dismiss.

First of all - I have not downplayed the Patriot battery capacity - it is quite clear the PAC-3 upgrade increase the Patriot capacity to 16 missiles - but a Patriot site has nothing to do with the original planned site in Poland, which was to consist of 10 ground based interceptors - the exact same missiles that are deployed in Alaska and California. These are not Patriot batteries, it is a different system entirely, with a different mission.

Second, it is entirely false that one Patriot battery can engage 160 missiles at the same time. Such a claim demonstrates a clear lack of understanding how the system works, and what an actual engagement looks like.

Then, of course, you write that (based on 100% success rate), as few as 11 missiles could disable the system, while conveniently failing to recognize the ability of the Patriot system to protect itself.

Yea - I didn't write anything about a Patriot battery because the Poland deployment did not include them. It was only in 2010 that the first Patriot battery made it to Poland, and only for limited training purposes and a show of solidarity with NATO.

Frankly, given the targeting capability of the Russian missile programs, the probability of success is much closer to zero, particularly when you consider the defensive capability of the Patriot system.

This is quite the blanket statement and ignores a lot of real world variables. But you seem to be arguing that one Patriot battery is enough to deter all potential Russian missile strikes - and that is simply not true.

As for your assumption that the Pole/Czech deployment was a stand-alone intended to protect those areas, that is counter-intuitive to your comments earlier that it is part of a multi-layered defense system.

I never said the proposed site in Poland and the radar in the Czech Republic was a stand alone system - you made that up. It in fact was part of a multi-layered missile defense system in coordination with NATO - but the mission of the Poland site would be to solely to protect NATO members from current and future Iranian threats. It did not change the dynamic (except politically) with Russia at all - to any honest observer at least.

Thus, any discussion about 'taking out' the "10 systems" is misleading in that it does not discuss the impact of the other system elements once the system is attacked.

It is not misleading - my comments are in the context of a Russian overreaction to the Polish site. It is quite clear that such a deployment has no impact on any perceived "strategic parity", and the Russian's said as much until it became a political wedge issue they could use.

... and you posit this is a new situation? That the Poles didn't know this threat existed before Crimea? Seriously?

I can only conclude from your comments that you don't read anything I write.

Poland has for years been wanting NATO bases and an American troop presence on their soil. They are desperate for stronger ties with the West as a protection against continued Russian aggression against former Soviet satellites (of which they are one).

Next time you're in town, come on down to Foggy Bottom - I'll show you.

This explains a lot. Unless it comes to getting my passport renewed, why don't you State types leave the real work to the people across the river.

It would seem that your information is very dated, and doesn't begin to reflect the true system configuration, and more importantly, its true and current capability.

I've presented plenty of backup for every claim I have made. You have shown not to even grasp the simple concept that there are missile defense systems outside of the Patriot battery.