GenSeneca
Well-Known Member
"The protocols in place on 9/11 for the FAA and NORAD to respond to a hijacking presumed that
* The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
* There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
* Hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
The threat of attack from the air within the United States was so small that the country was protected with only 14 fighter jets on ready and on alert -- two a piece, spread out across seven Air Force bases nationwide, including two at Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod in Massachusetts and two at Langley Air Force base in Hampton, Virginia. Otis is located 150 miles from New York City, and Langley Air Force Base is 130 miles south of Washington, D.C."--Debunking 9/11 myths
North America is surrounded by an area called the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is jointly administered by the United States (US) and Canada. This area, which is almost exclusively over water, serves as a national defence boundary for air traffic, as a sort of "buffer zone". Any aircraft that wishes to fly in or through the boundary must file either a Defence Visual Flight Rules (DVFR) flight plan or an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan before crossing the ADIZ. The pilot must have a transponder and a two-way radio while approaching and crossing the ADIZ. In the US, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) handles these requests; Transport Canada handles Canadian requests. Any aircraft flying in these zones without authorization may be identified as a threat and treated as enemy military aircraft.
ADIZ Link.
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is responsible for the intercept of aircraft inside the ADIZ. However, as it is the FAA and Transport Canada that handle the ADIZ clearances, a request for intercept from one of these agencies precedes any action by NORAD against civilian aircraft. NORAD do not, and never have, directly monitored air traffic inside the ADIZ themselves.
The hijackings on September 11 occurred within the North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS). The NEADS mission normally had four interceptor aircraft on duty at any given time – 2 at Otis Air National Guard Base (ANGB) in Massachusetts, and 2 at Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Virginia.
None of the aircraft hijacked on September 11 entered the ADIZ. Prior to September 11, there was no formal system in place for military intercepts of civilian aircraft outside the ADIZ. In the 10 years prior to September 2001 there was only one instance in which military aircraft were involved in an intercept of a civilian aircraft outside the ADIZ -- Payne Stewart's jet.
Now lets look at the individual Aircraft.
From the 9-11 commission report
***Flight 11 --- The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. All communications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin service.23
At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA's air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmis-sion, ATC instructed the aircraft's pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.24
At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.39
The difference between those times is about 32 minutes but since the FAA didn't contact NORAD at that time we will have to dig deeper to find out how much of a reaction time NORAD actually had.
The Boston FAA Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked.
NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call.
The F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information: "I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.119
Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to "hold as needed. "From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.
The fighters were scrambled at around the same time that Flight 11 struck the WTC. It was impossible for them to intercept that airliner.
* The hijacked aircraft would be readily identifiable and would not attempt to disappear;
* There would be time to address the problem through the appropriate FAA and NORAD chains of command; and
* Hijacking would take the traditional form: that is, it would not be a suicide hijacking designed to convert the aircraft into a guided missile.
The threat of attack from the air within the United States was so small that the country was protected with only 14 fighter jets on ready and on alert -- two a piece, spread out across seven Air Force bases nationwide, including two at Otis Air National Guard Base on Cape Cod in Massachusetts and two at Langley Air Force base in Hampton, Virginia. Otis is located 150 miles from New York City, and Langley Air Force Base is 130 miles south of Washington, D.C."--Debunking 9/11 myths
North America is surrounded by an area called the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), which is jointly administered by the United States (US) and Canada. This area, which is almost exclusively over water, serves as a national defence boundary for air traffic, as a sort of "buffer zone". Any aircraft that wishes to fly in or through the boundary must file either a Defence Visual Flight Rules (DVFR) flight plan or an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) flight plan before crossing the ADIZ. The pilot must have a transponder and a two-way radio while approaching and crossing the ADIZ. In the US, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) handles these requests; Transport Canada handles Canadian requests. Any aircraft flying in these zones without authorization may be identified as a threat and treated as enemy military aircraft.
ADIZ Link.
The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is responsible for the intercept of aircraft inside the ADIZ. However, as it is the FAA and Transport Canada that handle the ADIZ clearances, a request for intercept from one of these agencies precedes any action by NORAD against civilian aircraft. NORAD do not, and never have, directly monitored air traffic inside the ADIZ themselves.
The hijackings on September 11 occurred within the North East Air Defense Sector (NEADS). The NEADS mission normally had four interceptor aircraft on duty at any given time – 2 at Otis Air National Guard Base (ANGB) in Massachusetts, and 2 at Langley Air Force Base (AFB), Virginia.
None of the aircraft hijacked on September 11 entered the ADIZ. Prior to September 11, there was no formal system in place for military intercepts of civilian aircraft outside the ADIZ. In the 10 years prior to September 2001 there was only one instance in which military aircraft were involved in an intercept of a civilian aircraft outside the ADIZ -- Payne Stewart's jet.
Now lets look at the individual Aircraft.
From the 9-11 commission report
***Flight 11 --- The plane took off at 7:59. Just before 8:14, it had climbed to 26,000 feet, not quite its initial assigned cruising altitude of 29,000 feet. All communications and flight profile data were normal. About this time the "Fasten Seatbelt" sign would usually have been turned off and the flight attendants would have begun preparing for cabin service.23
At that same time, American 11 had its last routine communication with the ground when it acknowledged navigational instructions from the FAA's air traffic control (ATC) center in Boston. Sixteen seconds after that transmis-sion, ATC instructed the aircraft's pilots to climb to 35,000 feet. That message and all subsequent attempts to contact the flight were not acknowledged. From this and other evidence, we believe the hijacking began at 8:14 or shortly thereafter.24
At 8:46:40, American 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.39
The difference between those times is about 32 minutes but since the FAA didn't contact NORAD at that time we will have to dig deeper to find out how much of a reaction time NORAD actually had.
The Boston FAA Center did not follow the protocol in seeking military assistance through the prescribed chain of command. In addition to notifications within the FAA, Boston Center took the initiative, at 8:34, to contact the military through the FAA's Cape Cod facility. The center also tried to contact a former alert site in Atlantic City, unaware it had been phased out. At 8:37:52, Boston Center reached NEADS. This was the first notification received by the military-at any level-that American 11 had been hijacked.
NEADS ordered to battle stations the two F-15 alert aircraft at Otis Air Force Base in Falmouth, Massachusetts, 153 miles away from New York City. The air defense of America began with this call.
The F-15 fighters were scrambled at 8:46 from Otis Air Force Base. But NEADS did not know where to send the alert fighter aircraft, and the officer directing the fighters pressed for more information: "I don't know where I'm scrambling these guys to. I need a direction, a destination." Because the hijackers had turned off the plane's transponder, NEADS personnel spent the next minutes searching their radar scopes for the primary radar return. American 11 struck the North Tower at 8:46. Shortly after 8:50, while NEADS personnel were still trying to locate the flight, word reached them that a plane had hit the World Trade Center.119
Radar data show the Otis fighters were airborne at 8:53. Lacking a target, they were vectored toward military-controlled airspace off the Long Island coast. To avoid New York area air traffic and uncertain about what to do, the fighters were brought down to military airspace to "hold as needed. "From 9:09 to 9:13, the Otis fighters stayed in this holding pattern.
The fighters were scrambled at around the same time that Flight 11 struck the WTC. It was impossible for them to intercept that airliner.
