Our involvement in Iraq will span many years..

[RoccoR]

Rick, et al,

Yes.

(giggle) ......we have a major mutual defense treaty with japan - read up.

(COMMENT)

The defense pact is to provide security for both US and (external) Japanese interests (again no "internal interests"). The basing is part of the strategic reach for UN and allied forces. Remembering, of course, that the war in Korea is technically "not over." There are other US interests that, if challenged, will need those basing arrangements. Iraq cannot even defend itself, let alone defend the US or any of its regional interests. It even has a hard time resolving internal security issues. The situation in Iraq is in no way similar to Japan or Korea.

Iraq is practicing realpolitik - they have to stay in that area after we're gone.

(COMMENT)

The recent close contact (Iraq'v'Syria & Iraq'v'Iran) is for an entirely different reason than regional stability and good will (ie "realpolitik"). It is actually an internal struggle to circumvent the election outcome.

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html​

• •◦Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• •◦Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• •◦Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

Iraq making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces, are KEY to even the most basic short term objectives. Instead, what we find today is something very different.

• The Iraqi Constitution calls for Islam to be the source of all legislation. (Islamic State) All we need is a radical cleric to be in charge.
• Iraq had its elections late.
• Iraq’s elections were 7 months ago with no government in place yet.
• Former PM wins, but is blocked-out.
• Current PM loses, but is still in power.
• Current PM makes a deal with Terrorist Cleric via Iranian intervention.
• Currently, SOI/Awakening element are slipping away (from the GOI/ISF) to the insurgents.

This puts in question the most basic Democratization Efforts (GOI), and the military up-grading of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). It puts in question further military sales that might be used against the remaining element of the military (USF-I). And it opens up an entirely different discussion on how the US should proceed; given the greater influence of the anti-American Cleric Moktada al-Sadr, and the internal reach of Iran.

In any event, this scenario has not had a parallel in any other intervention (Germany, Japan, Korea, etc).

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[Neutral Evil]

America should not withdraw from Iraq until terrorism ends. It would be a display of weakness and represent a failure to execute the original plan of ending terrorism once and for all. I fear the Taliban and Al Qaida may capitalize on this and secretly rebuild their forces, become stronger than before and present an even deadlier threat to world peace. America made a mistake by not completing their campaign in Iraq.

They must either annex the country and make it part of the USA or pull out after they have accomplished the goal of eradicating terrorism once and for all.

 

[PLC1]

America should not withdraw from Iraq until terrorism ends. It would be a display of weakness and represent a failure to execute the original plan of ending terrorism once and for all. I fear the Taliban and Al Qaida may capitalize on this and secretly rebuild their forces, become stronger than before and present an even deadlier threat to world peace. America made a mistake by not completing their campaign in Iraq.

They must either annex the country and make it part of the USA or pull out after they have accomplished the goal of eradicating terrorism once and for all.

It is not possible to totally eradicate terrorism. That would be like starting an anti crime campaign with the goal of totally eradicating crime, or an anti drug campaign to completely end drug abuse.

 

[RoccoR]

Lawful Evil, PLC1, et al,

If we were talking about a 19th or 20th Century conventional war, one in which there was a FEBA, and two OPFORs locked in combat over territorial gain and control --- THEN --- you would be correct. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

But, before I get on my soapbox, let me first say, you are not alone; in fact you are in fast company. There are many - many senior leaders, including a number of O-10's (4-Stars) that have this wrong.

America should not withdraw from Iraq until terrorism ends. It would be a display of weakness and represent a failure to execute the original plan of ending terrorism once and for all. I fear the Taliban and Al Qaida may capitalize on this and secretly rebuild their forces, become stronger than before and present an even deadlier threat to world peace. America made a mistake by not completing their campaign in Iraq.

They must either annex the country and make it part of the USA or pull out after they have accomplished the goal of eradicating terrorism once and for all.

It is not possible to totally eradicate terrorism. That would be like starting an anti crime campaign with the goal of totally eradicating crime, or an anti drug campaign to completely end drug abuse.

(COMMENT)

As soon as you say - "terrorist" or the "Taliban," you have hit the trip-wire for asymmetric warfare (classic 4th Generation type stuff). But before I go further, let's make a slight distinction here:

• The "Taliban" is, from the POV of the Afghan, a Government in exile attempting to overthrow a hostile foreign occupation force that has installed a corrupt and nefarious criminal as President of their country.
  
• The al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization that adopted the calculated use of violence against civilian populations that support corrupt governments in order to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature; inducing fear to intimidation or coercion the population in a controlled way.

They are not one and the same thing. Not even close.

Conventional forces grapple over territory. Asymmetric forces are all about people and security. If you cannot protect the people, then you will get no support from them. If they see you as a fake protector, only interested in protecting a corrupt government, then you will get no support from them.

No insurgency or terrorist band can live and operate from a vacuum. They must derive their support from the population. In an asymmetric conflict, it is about the "people." If you don't have the people on your side, you cannot win against the insurgency.

To defeat the terrorist and insurgent --- you don't have to track them down and kill them (it is not an eradication program - you're not going after weeds and poppy's); but, you must isolate them, AND marginalize them from their support base --- and totally secure the target population. When (knowledgeable) leaders talk about counter-insurgency operations, that is what they are trying to say. But they don't have, in the case of Afghanistan, a clear strategy to do this.

Now I said knowledgeable. Because most of the senior leadership don't get it. We judge this by their deeds and actions, not their words. And that is exactly how the Afghan population will judge them. If the US Strategy does not protect the population, if your surge operations sweeps through and area and allow the insurgents to follow-up in a wake behind them, then you have demonstrated your insincerity to the Afghan.

Why, because conventional "Surge" type operations are only effective if they are used to form an impenetrable defensive barrier between the insurgent (the Taliban) and the target (the Afghan population). If the US (ISAF) cannot secure and protect the Afghan population, then there is no chance for the US to achieve any success. You don't seek-out and engage the insurgents in the same way that you hunt for a tank battalion.

If we started a solid counter-insurgency program today, fully funded and supported, it would take and additional 100,000 troops and ten more years before we would see success. And at $100B-to-$150B/per year, that would cost us nearly a Trillion more dollars.

OR,

We could withdraw, wait for the Taliban to re-emerge, and then start our own asymmetric campaign against them.

BUT!

If we keep playing this conventional game, we will waste a lot of money, suffer casualties, political wear ourselves out - AND - eventually withdraw under domestic political pressure --- with absolutely nothing to show for our efforts.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[Rick]

PLC1, et al,

In Vietnam, my first combat tour, we fell prey to the intellect of (what was then known as) the "Whiz Kids." The were the best and the brightest.
[See: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,896423,00.html ]

​

(COMMENT)

In Iraq, we fell prey to the PNAC (Project for a New American Century).

• Elliott Abrams
• Jeb Bush
• Dick Cheney
• Eliot A. Cohen
• Steve Forbes
• Zalmay Khalilzad
• I. Lewis Libby
• Dan Quayle
• Henry S. Rowen (Former Whiz Kid)
• Richard Perle
• Donald Rumsfeld
• Paul Wolfowitz

To understand the agenda and primer for the PNAC you have to do some reading, but --- in essence, they are the guding force behind the "Pre-emptive War Strategy.

The key, to the time of the Whiz Kids and the link to the PNAC, is this: If you were not in or of the PNAC, you were an outsider --- and thus your voice was not heard.

This spells trouble for everyone. They were voice behind the Iraq war drum beating. They are all heavy hitters and individually successful in their own right. They are no set of dummies (except maybe for AMB Zalmay Khalilzad, who is IMO a walking disaster). I was in Iraq when Ambassador Khalilzad allowed the Interim Government to go Islamic (Non-secular Constitution), following the example of Syria. He made the same mistake in Afghanistan. Just what the world needs is another non-Secular State for lunitic Islamics. With the Constitution behind him, Muqtada al-Sadr has reason to believe that he can make a steady rise to power and (eventually) become the Prominent cleric and political leader of Iraq. It will be the included in the price of failure.

All these names should seem very familiar, and all were PNAC; but, this small list is not all inclusive.

Bottom Line: "The PNAC" made me do it!!!

Most Respectfully,
R

Comparing the iraq war to the vietnam war is stupid. Vietnam was lost, iraq was won (although obozo may yet be able to screw it up). Vietnam was fought by Robert McNamara, a guy who thought he could run the war like he ran a car company. It was also governed by such utterly bankrupt strategic doctrines as "gradual escalation". Iraq was fought with a doctrine known since the year one: overwhelming military force. Old hippies got in love with the notion of the US losing wars, in their youth, and they desperately wanted iraq to be another vietnam, but it is so only in their minds.

 

[Gipper]

Lawful Evil, PLC1, et al,

If we were talking about a 19th or 20th Century conventional war, one in which there was a FEBA, and two OPFORs locked in combat over territorial gain and control --- THEN --- you would be correct. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

But, before I get on my soapbox, let me first say, you are not alone; in fact you are in fast company. There are many - many senior leaders, including a number of O-10's (4-Stars) that have this wrong.

​

(COMMENT)

As soon as you say - "terrorist" or the "Taliban," you have hit the trip-wire for asymmetric warfare (classic 4th Generation type stuff). But before I go further, let's make a slight distinction here:

• The "Taliban" is, from the POV of the Afghan, a Government in exile attempting to overthrow a hostile foreign occupation force that has installed a corrupt and nefarious criminal as President of their country.
  
• The al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization that adopted the calculated use of violence against civilian populations that support corrupt governments in order to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature; inducing fear to intimidation or coercion the population in a controlled way.

They are not one and the same thing. Not even close.

Conventional forces grapple over territory. Asymmetric forces are all about people and security. If you cannot protect the people, then you will get no support from them. If they see you as a fake protector, only interested in protecting a corrupt government, then you will get no support from them.

No insurgency or terrorist band can live and operate from a vacuum. They must derive their support from the population. In an asymmetric conflict, it is about the "people." If you don't have the people on your side, you cannot win against the insurgency.

To defeat the terrorist and insurgent --- you don't have to track them down and kill them (it is not an eradication program - you're not going after weeds and poppy's); but, you must isolate them, AND marginalize them from their support base --- and totally secure the target population. When (knowledgeable) leaders talk about counter-insurgency operations, that is what they are trying to say. But they don't have, in the case of Afghanistan, a clear strategy to do this.

Now I said knowledgeable. Because most of the senior leadership don't get it. We judge this by their deeds and actions, not their words. And that is exactly how the Afghan population will judge them. If the US Strategy does not protect the population, if your surge operations sweeps through and area and allow the insurgents to follow-up in a wake behind them, then you have demonstrated your insincerity to the Afghan.

Why, because conventional "Surge" type operations are only effective if they are used to form an impenetrable defensive barrier between the insurgent (the Taliban) and the target (the Afghan population). If the US (ISAF) cannot secure and protect the Afghan population, then there is no chance for the US to achieve any success. You don't seek-out and engage the insurgents in the same way that you hunt for a tank battalion.

If we started a solid counter-insurgency program today, fully funded and supported, it would take and additional 100,000 troops and ten more years before we would see success. And at $100B-to-$150B/per year, that would cost us nearly a Trillion more dollars.

OR,

We could withdraw, wait for the Taliban to re-emerge, and then start our own asymmetric campaign against them.

BUT!

If we keep playing this conventional game, we will waste a lot of money, suffer casualties, political wear ourselves out - AND - eventually withdraw under domestic political pressure --- with absolutely nothing to show for our efforts.

Most Respectfully,
R

Well said and I think you outlined the dilemma the US has in Afghan.

I do not see how keeping a large fighting force in country works. They see us as invaders. Just declare victory and leave. Then when the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda reasserts themselves, take covert action by supporting those who oppose them with intel and hardware. And, use our technology to take out the leadership from above.

Continuing to lose American lives in that sh*thole country is absurd.

 

[PLC1]

Lawful Evil, PLC1, et al,

If we were talking about a 19th or 20th Century conventional war, one in which there was a FEBA, and two OPFORs locked in combat over territorial gain and control --- THEN --- you would be correct. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

But, before I get on my soapbox, let me first say, you are not alone; in fact you are in fast company. There are many - many senior leaders, including a number of O-10's (4-Stars) that have this wrong.

​

(COMMENT)

As soon as you say - "terrorist" or the "Taliban," you have hit the trip-wire for asymmetric warfare (classic 4th Generation type stuff). But before I go further, let's make a slight distinction here:

• The "Taliban" is, from the POV of the Afghan, a Government in exile attempting to overthrow a hostile foreign occupation force that has installed a corrupt and nefarious criminal as President of their country.
  
• The al-Qaeda is a terrorist organization that adopted the calculated use of violence against civilian populations that support corrupt governments in order to attain goals that are political, religious or ideological in nature; inducing fear to intimidation or coercion the population in a controlled way.

They are not one and the same thing. Not even close.

Conventional forces grapple over territory. Asymmetric forces are all about people and security. If you cannot protect the people, then you will get no support from them. If they see you as a fake protector, only interested in protecting a corrupt government, then you will get no support from them.

No insurgency or terrorist band can live and operate from a vacuum. They must derive their support from the population. In an asymmetric conflict, it is about the "people." If you don't have the people on your side, you cannot win against the insurgency.

To defeat the terrorist and insurgent --- you don't have to track them down and kill them (it is not an eradication program - you're not going after weeds and poppy's); but, you must isolate them, AND marginalize them from their support base --- and totally secure the target population. When (knowledgeable) leaders talk about counter-insurgency operations, that is what they are trying to say. But they don't have, in the case of Afghanistan, a clear strategy to do this.

Now I said knowledgeable. Because most of the senior leadership don't get it. We judge this by their deeds and actions, not their words. And that is exactly how the Afghan population will judge them. If the US Strategy does not protect the population, if your surge operations sweeps through and area and allow the insurgents to follow-up in a wake behind them, then you have demonstrated your insincerity to the Afghan.

Why, because conventional "Surge" type operations are only effective if they are used to form an impenetrable defensive barrier between the insurgent (the Taliban) and the target (the Afghan population). If the US (ISAF) cannot secure and protect the Afghan population, then there is no chance for the US to achieve any success. You don't seek-out and engage the insurgents in the same way that you hunt for a tank battalion.

If we started a solid counter-insurgency program today, fully funded and supported, it would take and additional 100,000 troops and ten more years before we would see success. And at $100B-to-$150B/per year, that would cost us nearly a Trillion more dollars.

OR,

We could withdraw, wait for the Taliban to re-emerge, and then start our own asymmetric campaign against them.

BUT!

If we keep playing this conventional game, we will waste a lot of money, suffer casualties, political wear ourselves out - AND - eventually withdraw under domestic political pressure --- with absolutely nothing to show for our efforts

Most Respectfully,
R

OK, I think you have it right. So, if we had gone in to Afganistan with an overwhelming force from the beginning with a "a fully funded and supported solid counter-insurgency program" we might be at least close to victory by now.

Of course we didn't do that.

What we should have done was to have gone in with a surgical strike force to get Bin Laden and his men, then left. Had we done that, we'd have avoided war altogether.

But, alas, we didn't do that either.


Woulda, coulda, shoulda.

So now the choices are just as you described them.

Do you think that the American voters are ready to commit an additional hundred thousand troops and another trillion dollars to Afganistan?

Neither do I.

So, our choices at this point are to either simply leave, or to continue to do what we've been doing and continue to get the results we've been getting.

At least maybe next time we won't listen to the PNAC.

 

[RoccoR]

Gipper, PLC1, et al,


Pretty much, we've made some serious mistakes that have painted ourselves into a corner.

Just declare victory and leave.

(COMMENT)

From a "conventional military" standpoint, we HAVE won; we've achieved "victory." By any metric you want to use, this goal was achieved.

It was holes in our defenses that eroded.

Yes, we can declare our mission completed and withdraw.

Then when the Taliban and/or al-Qaeda reasserts themselves, take covert action by supporting those who oppose them with intel and hardware. And, use our technology to take out the leadership from above.

(COMMENT)

Yes, with small "stay behind forces" and covert activity. Again, it would be expensive, but not to the tone of $100B/year.

AND, it might even change the way the next government does business.

We all know, that if the Taliban march back into Kabul, they will waste no time in canceling Hamid Karzai's ticket. He has become a thorn in everyone's side. He'll just have to accept that. But, the Taliban will also know that there is a Predator out there with Hellfire that can, without warning, wack them. Reverse "terrorism."

OK, I think you have it right. So, if we had gone in to Afganistan with an overwhelming force from the beginning with a "a fully funded and supported solid counter-insurgency program" we might be at least close to victory by now..

(COMMENT)

Yes, very much so. In fact, we would be in the caretaker mode, using Afghan's and Third Country Nationals (proxy security operators) securing the countryside, with US Foreign Service Officers, DAOs and Advisors in Administrative roles, grooming the next generation of Afghan Leaders.

What we should have done was to have gone in with a surgical strike force to get Bin Laden and his men, then left. Had we done that, we'd have avoided war altogether.

(COMMENT)

This would have been another alternative. It is always cheaper to periodically decimate the ant hill from a good standoff range, burn it to the ground, and let them slowly rebuild it again, only to have us (5 or 6 Years later) burn it to the ground again.

It is not only much cheaper, but it allows us to keep better tabs on them and observe them more closely.

Do you think that the American voters are ready to commit an additional hundred thousand troops and another trillion dollars to Afganistan?

Neither do I.

(COMMENT)

The current argument is that we must resolve this in our favor, if we are to insure that Afghanistan won't be used again as another safe haven; threatening American security. The will use all types of debating techniques to further this notion. They will characterize it divisive ways that are covered in emotion: Victory before Defeat, Never Retreat, Honor are Fallen, etc, etc, etc... It will not be a rational discussion, or tactical debate about reasonable expectations.

Again, this is "inside the box" (20th Century) thinking. Asymmetric non-state actors are not tried to a region or territory. It is not about the ground they occupy, but people and popular support. Before al-Qaeda was in Tora Bora, it was on the Arabian Peninsula, and before that, it was in Khartoum.

It is very unclear, for the next five years, how the US Domestic General Public is going to view this. I would not be surprised if the Ruling Elite (which ever it is today: The Council on Foreign Relations, The American Enterprise Institute, The Committee on the Present Danger, The Hudson Institute; all interrelated neo-conservative "Think Tanks") begins pressing their agenda very soon. They know how to do it. If you look at the key founders of these new emerging Think Tanks, you'll see an eery resemblance to the Membership of the PNAC. They will use all the right phrases and push the right buttons to get the exact emotion they think will promote continued support.

So, our choices at this point are to either simply leave, or to continue to do what we've been doing and continue to get the results we've been getting.

(COMMENT)

Well, I'm not sure that we are going to see and significant change in results. While GEN David Petraeus clearly understand these concepts, I'm not sure that he has a strategy. I understand how a car works. I don't have the knowledge, skills and abilities (KSAs) to build one. I believe that GEN Petraeus has much the same KSA weakness in counter-insurgency strategy and operations.

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[PLC1]

It is very unclear, for the next five years, how the US Domestic General Public is going to view this. I would not be surprised if the Ruling Elite (which ever it is today: The Council on Foreign Relations, The American Enterprise Institute, The Committee on the Present Danger, The Hudson Institute; all interrelated neo-conservative "Think Tanks") begins pressing their agenda very soon. They know how to do it. If you look at the key founders of these new emerging Think Tanks, you'll see an eery resemblance to the Membership of the PNAC. They will use all the right phrases and push the right buttons to get the exact emotion they think will promote continued support.

No doubt we will hear a sales pitch for "victory" in Afganistan, an end to terrorism, and so on. We'll hear comments on the other side as well. Which side will the majority of voters believe, though? I think the American public is tired of war now, and another hundred thousand and a huge commitment to funding the war, particularly if our own economy stays down, is going to be very unpopular.

Who knows what the outcome of all of this might be? Most people have forgotten the PNAC and what it stood for.

At least the government is smart enough to use a professional military. Were there a draft, we would have seen '60s style protests already.

A trillion dollars amounts to about ten grand apiece from a hundred million US taxpayers. If they were asked to commit ten grand of their own money to the effort in Afganistan, there would be zero support.

 

[Rick]

Once again - remember when Bush was in, a staple anti-Bush screech from the leftwing was that the REAL war was in afghanistan, not Iraq. NOW, they morph back into their 100% appeasement mode.

 

[pocketfullofshells]

Once again - remember when Bush was in, a staple anti-Bush screech from the leftwing was that the REAL war was in afghanistan, not Iraq. NOW, they morph back into their 100% appeasement mode.

yea like me...who has to go after the Republicans for still wanting to back out of Afganistan.. and the Taliban...and Bin ladin who we know to be there or the border...but they want to cut and run...I supported agfanistan from the start, and still do today...I said send more troops...I still stand by that..

I spoke against the Iraq war from start to finish...but always stated that once we stared the mistake...we had to finish it. I supported the Surge...even though as much as Republicans claim...its not the main reason things got better in Iraq...it was still needed. And needed from the start. I said we needed more troops going in, if we where going to go in...I said the first part of the war would be easy...it was the end insurgency would be the hard part...I said Iran would fund the Insurgency as it did ( though I did think they would push harder even)

 

[Rick]

I spoke against the Iraq war from start to finish...but always stated that once we stared the mistake...we had to finish it.

Too bad you didn't show Colin Powell your unrevealed spy satellite photos proving no WMDs.

I supported the Surge...even though as much as Republicans claim...its not the main reason things got better in Iraq

Not agreed to by any serious qualified military expert.

 

[RoccoR]

Rick, et al,

Let's look at that a little closer.

Once again - remember when Bush was in, a staple anti-Bush screech from the leftwing was that the REAL war was in afghanistan, not Iraq. NOW, they morph back into their 100% appeasement mode.

(COMMENT)

This was nearly seven (7) years ago. Of course, after seven (7) years, and unfocused, you just can't wind back the clock and start throwing money at the problem that has been aggravated and deteriorating for all that time.

It is not actually a change, but more revolving around the point that the patient was NOT treated for cancer when it was diagnosed. Left untreated, for seven years, the disease has NOW advanced to the point where it might be inoperable.

I not sure whether it is hopeless; but what I am sure is, that it would have been easier to address seven (7) years ago than it will be now.

Neither outcomes, thus far, in Iraq or Afghanistan --- are considered well handled. Given the money, resources and blood, none of our leaders have demonstrated themselves to be shining stars.

Neither Administrations
Not the Military Leadership
Not the Foreign Service.
Not Congress.

They all failed in some way. Collectively, it was devastating. It hurt the:

• Iraqis
• Afghans
• Americans

Most Respectfully,
R

 

[Rick]

Rick, et al,

Let's look at that a little closer.

​

(COMMENT)

This was nearly seven (7) years ago. Of course, after seven (7) years, and unfocused, you just can't wind back the clock and start throwing money at the problem that has been aggravated and deteriorating for all that time.

It is not actually a change, but more revolving around the point that the patient was NOT treated for cancer when it was diagnosed. Left untreated, for seven years, the disease has NOW advanced to the point where it might be inoperable.

I not sure whether it is hopeless; but what I am sure is, that it would have been easier to address seven (7) years ago than it will be now.

Neither outcomes, thus far, in Iraq or Afghanistan --- are considered well handled. Given the money, resources and blood, none of our leaders have demonstrated themselves to be shining stars.

Neither Administrations
Not the Military Leadership
Not the Foreign Service.
Not Congress.

They all failed in some way. Collectively, it was devastating. It hurt the:

• Iraqis
• Afghans
• Americans

Most Respectfully,
R

The claim that we "failed" in iraq is simply not supported by the facts. We overthrew the worst regime in a critical part of the world, which had attacked three neighboring countries, and certainly would be pursuing by now a plan to acquire nuclear weapons. The casualties are paltry compared to other major wars, and usually people lard into their claimed casualties the results of sectarian fighting AFTER the US liberation. We established the first genuine arab democracy, and only the second democracy in the middle east. Obozo may still yet screw it up, but iraq can hardly be called a "failure".

As for afghanistan, there's no evidence a magic solution was available seven years ago that's not there now.

 

[RoccoR]

Rick, et al,

Terms like "success" and "failed" or "victory" and "defeat" are only useful if you have a very firm metric to which you can apply them. Otherwise they are not useful or applicable.

The claim that we "failed" in iraq is simply not supported by the facts. We overthrew the worst regime in a critical part of the world, which had attacked three neighboring countries, and certainly would be pursuing by now a plan to acquire nuclear weapons. The casualties are paltry compared to other major wars, and usually people lard into their claimed casualties the results of sectarian fighting AFTER the US liberation. We established the first genuine arab democracy, and only the second democracy in the middle east. Obozo may still yet screw it up, but iraq can hardly be called a "failure".

As for afghanistan, there's no evidence a magic solution was available seven years ago that's not there now.

(COMMENT)

You are applying "your metric." And by your standards you judge the outcome. I agree, with some reservations, with the statement "failed" in iraq is simply not supported by the facts" (sic) when conpaired to "your metric." In fact, I would go a step further and say that the term "failed" does NOT apply to the general evaluation of the strategy (military, diplomatic or economic) outcomes.

But let us suppose that we apply the stated metric of The President (GW Bush), as he qualified (officially) the definition of "victory." That does have a metric (albeit, not the same as yours).

Executive Summary
OUR NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR VICTORY IN IRAQ:
Helping the Iraqi People Defeat the Terrorists and Build an Inclusive Democratic State​

Victory in Iraq is Defined in Stages

• Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.
• Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.
• Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

SOURCE: http://www.dod.gov/pubs/iraq_national_strategy_20051130[1].pdf

The outline, supra, gives us the ability to place us in the developmental stage of "Victory" as it was defined by President Bush. Most optomists would say that we recently entered the Medium Term; but with reservations in the areas of democracy and security. Both DOD and DOS would play down those shortcomings. But by no stretch of the imagination are we in the Long Term definition. And by no stretch of the imagination is the current state of Iraq achieved the expectations that (then) Ambassador Negroponte expressed in the Rotunda of the Presidential Palace back in 2005.

But your metrics are more in line with the old element of the (lesser included) MDMP in support of the goals and objectives. Much closer aligned. And in that regards, I have to agree, that CJFT-7, MNF-I, and much later, USF-I, all performed outstandingly. They did, given the constraints they had to work with, every thing our leadership asked of them. I just don't believe they were well lead, especially at the most senior levels.

In the DOD Directive from the Secretary of Defense (Rumsfield), there were eight (8) objectives to be accomlished, a part of the military decision making process (MDMP). The eight mission objectives for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) are:

1. End the regime of Saddam Hussein. (Completed)
   
2. Eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. (N/A)
   
3. Capture or drive out terrorists. (Backfire: Created more terrorists and an insurgency.)
   
4. Collect intelligence on terrorist networks. (Troubled: WIP - US Intel unprepared.)
   
5. Collect intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction activity. (N/A: Historical data only.)
   
6. Secure Iraq’s oil fields. (Secured: Still under insurgent attack.)
   
7. Deliver humanitarian relief and end sanctions. (Underway)
   
8. Help Iraq achieve representative self-government and insure its territorial integrity. (Backfired: WIP)

Each of these could be a discussion all its own. But at the end of the day, Iraq is what it is. Prime Minister al-Maliki did not give-up the leadership, but asked Iran (of Axis of Evil fame), to set-up an alliance with the insurgent and anti-American Cleric, Moqtadar al-Sadr, so as to maintain power. That puts Iran in the "King Maker" role.

As for afghanistan, there's no evidence a magic solution was available seven years ago that's not there now.

(COMMENT)

That depend on how you evaluate the position that the US is in. Seven years ago, US embedded resources could have been withdrawn in less than 60 days. Today, it would take a year just to turn-off the lights.

If the US had immediately withdrawn after the destruction of Tora Bora, and the disruption of al-Qaeda, it would have not created another set of issues.

• It would become a safe haven from which terrorists could plan attacks against America, American interests abroad, and our allies.
• Middle East reformers would never again fully trust American assurances of support for democracy and human rights in the region – a historic opportunity lost.
• The resultant tribal and sectarian chaos would have major consequences for American security and interests in the region.

Again, each of these is it own concept and discussion.

But, much like Iraq, the lack of KSAs (knowledge, skills and abilities) in the organization (Senior Executive and Presidential Level including the NSC), structure and strategy in Afghanistan is a clear symptom of the greater systemic problem in the National Security Decision Making Process (a level up from the MDMP). And those KSA deficiencies could lead to a failure at both the military and diplomatic level; if not outcomes that are inconsistent with the original intent.

Most Respectfully,
R